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Executive Summary 
Behavioural tracking presents a significant privacy risk to Canadians, particularly when 
their online behaviours reveal sensitive information that could be used to discriminate against 
them. This concern is particularly relevant in the context of online health information seeking, 
since searches can reveal details about health conditions and concerns that the individual may 
wish to keep private. The privacy threats are exacerbated because behavioural tracking 
mechanisms are large invisible to users, and many are unaware of the strategies and mechanisms 
available to track online behaviour. In this project, we seek to document the behavioural tracking 
practices of consumer health websites, and to examine the privacy policy disclosures of these 
same practices. The results of our research demonstrate that tracking is widespread on consumer 
health information websites; furthermore, sites recommended by Information Professionals are 
similar to sites returned in Google searches in terms of overall tracking, though they show lower 
levels of third-party advertiser presence. Privacy policy disclosure of tracking practices is largely 
ineffective, and website visitors cannot easily determine tracking practices from a review of the 
website privacy policies. Taken together, these results suggest that alternative mechanisms are 
required to detect and/or mitigate or neutralize the behavioural tracking measures used on many 
consumer health information websites.  
Our goal is to raise awareness of behavioural tracking and potential responses by 
communicating these results, and information about the risks of and responses to behavioural 
tracking, to three different groups: the academic community, Library and Information Science 
professionals, and the general public. This communication is carried out using a variety of 
mechanisms including presentations, publications, public lectures, and an educational video. In 
addition, we will provide education regarding behavioural tracking and associated risks to an 
important group of professional intermediaries: librarians. Armed with this education, librarians 
will be better able to select privacy-respecting information resources for their clients, and they 
will also be better prepared to address behavioural tracking as part of the information literacy 
education for the general public that they undertake as part of their professional practice. 
 v 
Sommaire 
Le pistage comportemental présente un risque important pour la protection de la vie 
privée des Canadiens, particulièrement lorsqu’il se produit dans des domaines où l’information 
récoltée pourrait être utilisée comme outil de discrimination entre utilisateurs. La nature privée de 
l’information en matière de santé amène un risque particulièrement élevé à cet égard pour la vie 
privée des internautes, puisque les recherches d’information à ce sujet peuvent révéler des détails 
qu’on désirerait garder pour soi. L’invisibilité des mécanismes utilisés pour le pistage 
comportemental exacerbe de plus les risques pour la protection de la vie privée et bien des 
Canadiens ne sont pas au courant des stratégies qu’ils peuvent employer pour contrer — ou, du 
moins, atténuer — les effets du pistage comportemental. 
Les résultats de ce projet de recherche indiquent que le pistage comportemental est 
présent sur la majorité des sites web offrant de l’information relative à la santé. Les sites web 
recommandés par les professionnels de l’information, en outre, ne font pas meilleure figure que 
ceux trouvés à l’aide de recherches sur Google, bien qu’ils présent un taux un peu moins élevé de 
pistage par des annonceurs. La divulgation des pratiques de pistage comportemental dans les 
politiques de confidentialité est par ailleurs peu efficace et, à leur lecture, il est difficile pour un 
internaute de déterminer quelles sont les pratiques de pistage comportemental en cours sur le site 
web qu’il visite. Ces résultats suggèrent que des mécanismes alternatifs sont requis pour détecter 
le pistage comportemental ou pour, du moins, en amoindrir les effets. 
Notre but est de sensibiliser à la fois la communauté universitaire, celle des professionnels 
de l’information et le public en général sur les effets du pistage comportemental et des 
mécanismes qui peuvent être employés pour en atténuer les effets. Divisé en plusieurs volets, cet 
exercice de dissémination prend plusieurs formes destinées à ces diverses communautés : 
présentations, publications et production d’une vidéo. Nous procéderons de plus à un atelier de 
formation continue auprès de bibliothécaires, qui pourront ainsi proposer à leurs usagers des sites 
web plus respectueux de la vie privée et également disséminer ce savoir auprès de leurs usagers. 
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Introduction 
Most Canadians consider health information to be extremely sensitive. It 
is inappropriate for this type of information to be used in online 
behavioural advertising. 
(Chantal Bernier, Interim Privacy Commissioner, January 15, 2014) 
Health information is indeed considered among the most sensitive of personal information 
(see, for example, Nass et al, 2009), and most discussions of health information privacy focus on 
one particular issue: the protection of medical information, usually in the form of electronic 
health records (e.g., Pritts, 2008; Whetton, 2013; Norgren, 2013). In the quote above, however, 
Ms. Bernier is referring to a different kind of health information: details about health-related 
online searches, collected by Google Adsense and used to target health-related advertisements 
across multiple websites and over time1. She made her remark in a 2014 press release reporting 
the results of an investigation of a consumer complaint regarding this activity that concluded that 
the practice contravenes both online behavioural advertising guidelines issued by the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) and Google’s own privacy policy. The investigation, 
triggered by a consumer complaint of being “followed” by advertisements for CPAP devices after 
searching for information online using Google, documented the use of sensitive personal 
information to deliver interest-based advertisements by one online advertising service (Google 
Adsense). This raises an important question: how common is such tracking across consumer 
health information websites? 
Other research and the results of investigative reporting (see Soltani et al., 2009; Angwin, 
2010) demonstrate that online behavioural tracking is a common and perhaps even ubiquitous 
practice. These investigations examine a cross-section of commonly visited websites, and the 
results are thus broadly representative of the behavioural tracking that Internet users are likely to 
encounter on a regular basis. Among the websites examined in these studies, however, only a 
small proportion are consumer health information sites: Soltani et al., 2009, for example, reports 
the results of an analysis of the top 50 sites identified by Quantcast in 2009, and among these 
                                                
1 https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2014/nr-c_140115_e.asp 
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only one (WebMD) is a site that delivers consumer health information. Thus, these results tell us 
relatively little about behavioural tracking practices on sites where users are likely to reveal, by 
their activities, detailed information about their health status, health-related concerns, and health-
related activities. The current project seeks to address this gap by examining behavioural tracking 
practices on English and French language consumer health information websites. In addition, we 
examine the disclosure practices regarding tracking on these sites. One important aspect of our 
project is to contrast tracking activities on sites recommended by Library and Information 
Science professionals with those sites, not recommended by these professionals, that consumers 
would find on their own through internet searches for common health conditions. This contrast 
provides insight into the degree to which information professionals are successfully protecting 
the privacy-related interests of their patrons in their online health information recommendations.  
Background 
Behavioural Tracking and Privacy 
It has long been recognized that Internet users face privacy risks as they navigate online 
spaces. Historically, these privacy concerns have focused on the collection, use, and retention of 
personally identifying information (PII) that is explicitly provided by users in the course of online 
activities (e.g., registration information that includes name, email, etc.). More recently, however, 
websites and associated advertisers have increased their use of behavioural tracking measures 
that collect non-personally identifying information (NPII) that cannot be associated with a 
specific identifiable individual, including IP address, browser configuration information, and 
details of browsing behaviour (Soltani et al., 2009; McDonald & Cranor, 2010; Ayenson et al., 
2011; Chester, 2012).  
Behavioural tracking is often justified as a tool that supports positive outcomes such as 
website personalization and targeted advertising that delivers information on products and 
services that are of interest to the user. The information gathered through this tracking, however, 
can also be used to discriminate against consumers through activities such as price discrimination 
or even denial of service (e.g., insurance applications; Center for Digital Democracy et al., 2009; 
Castelluccia & Narayanan, 2012). The detailed personal profile that can be developed on the 
basis of behavioural tracking, especially when that information is integrated across multiple visits 
and/or multiple websites, is of potential interest to employers, insurers, and providers of financial 
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services — in fact, to anyone who would derive value from the segmentation of Internet users 
according to their online behaviour and characteristics inferred on the basis of that behaviour 
(Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013). Privacy threats associated with this profiling are 
particularly acute in the context of health information, since the searches that individuals conduct 
can reveal sensitive and potentially damaging information regarding health-related concerns and 
interests (Anderson-Inman & Horney, 1998; Berger, Wagner & Baker, 2005; Cline & Haynes 
2001). 
Various privacy guidelines have been proposed for the collection, retention and use of 
personal information in the online environment (e.g., the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, developed by the Council of 
Europe, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data). Arguably foremost among these 
is the set of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPs) proposed in 1973 by The US Secretary’s 
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems. FIPs and other guidelines are not 
themselves enforceable, but these principles form the basis of legally enforceable regulatory 
frameworks including the European Commission Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) 
and Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). 
It is important to recognize that regulatory frameworks did not originally contemplate the 
collection of NPII, and were focused solely on the regulation of the collection and use of 
personally identifiable information. Regulatory bodies have noted this problem, and are 
beginning to respond. The European Data Protection Directive, for example, has recently been 
extended to cover any information that a website causes to be stored in a users’ browser (thereby 
covering some if not all forms of NPII; 2009 EU directive 2009/136/EC). The OPC has recently 
developed guidelines2 and a policy position3 on online behavioural advertising that address the 
application of PIPEDA to the collection and use of NPII in the context of online behavioural 
advertising. The guidelines and policy position extend PIPEDA coverage to at least some NPII 
through the argument that this information can be personally identifying, requiring opt-in consent 
for collection and use of sensitive information, and opt-out or implied consent for information 
that is less sensitive. These advances achieve the positive outcome of increasing the reach of 
                                                
2 https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2011/gl_ba_1112_e.pdf 
3 http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/2012/bg_ba_1206_e.asp 
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legislative regulatory frameworks with respect to online behavioural tracking. At the same time, 
enforcement is challenging and thus uneven, given that is typically reliant on consumer complaint 
to identify breaches. Moreover, unless the regulations require opt-in consent, users may remain 
unaware of behavioural tracking, since many will fail to read privacy policies that provide 
disclosure for opt-out consent (Milne et al., 2004; Vila et al., 2003). 
Increasingly, consumers are seeking health information online (Fox, 2011; Statistics 
Canada, 2011), revealing in the process potentially sensitive information about their health status, 
health concerns, and health-related activities. It is important, therefore, that we understand the 
behavioural tracking practices of the consumer health websites used by consumers, in order to 
develop educational interventions and other strategies that will help to ensure consumer privacy 
with respect to this type of health information. 
Consumer Health Information 
Consumer interest in health information has been increasing in response to a movement 
toward patient participation in health care decisions (Entwistle, 2000, Holmes et al., 2005, 
Coulter, 1997, Gafni et al., 1999) and sociocultural changes including the general consumer 
movement and women’s health movements of the mid to late 1990s (Marshall, 1992). Health 
information is and has been available through a variety of sources, including health care 
professionals, family and friends, and various forms of media (Hesse et al, 2005). Increasingly, 
however, consumers are seeking this information online, and searches for health information are 
among the most common of online activities. The latest iteration of the Canadian Internet Use 
Survey, for example, indicates that 69.9% of Canadians who use Internet at home search for 
medical or health related information, making it one of the most widespread online activities, 
ranking above paying bills online (Statistics Canada, 2011).  
The proliferation of health information on the Internet has certainly brought many positive 
outcomes. Even though consumers report that their preferred source of health information is a 
health professional (Hesse et al., 2005), they often consider that the information they receive 
from these professionals is insufficient (Coulter, Entwistle and Gilbert, 1999; Chen and Siu, 
2001; Saver et al., 2007). In this context, access to online health information increases 
consumers’ health knowledge, such as their understanding of the risks and benefits of treatment, 
and enables them to make more informed decisions (Coulter, 2006; Coulter et al., 2006). For 
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consumers, the Internet also improves anonymous access to information on stigmatized 
conditions or issues such as mental illness or sexual health (Anderson-Inman and Horney, 1998; 
Cline and Haynes, 2001; Berger, Wagner and Baker, 2005). 
At the same time, online health information presents risks to consumers. There are the 
obvious risks associated with inaccurate or misleading information, particularly acute because 
consumers use health information to make important decisions (Fox and Rainie, 2002). Of 
particular relevance in the current context is that fact that consumers seeking health information 
online are also subject to the privacy risks associated with the collection of personal information 
and behavioural tracking data (Soltani et al., 2009; McDonald and Cranor, 2010; Ayenson et al., 
2011; Chester, 2012), and the often sensitive nature of health information seeking serves only to 
heighten the potential negative consequences. Many Internet users are unaware of behavioural 
tracking, and even those who are familiar with the issue may not fully understand the range and 
power of behavioural tracking mechanisms (McDonald and Cranor, 2010). Given this 
background, online health information seeking creates a ‘perfect storm’ of privacy concern for 
Canadians. 
Digital Literacy and the Role of Information Professionals 
Librarians are and have long been important intermediaries in the search for health 
information (Lunin, 1987; Marshall et al., 1991; Murray, 2008; Rees, 1991; Rubenstein, 2012), 
and health related questions are common at library reference desks (Marshall et al., 1991; Wood 
et al., 2000). In the past, information professionals have directed patrons to print sources for 
health information. Increasingly, however, the best and most up-to-date health information is 
available on the Internet, and this shift has brought about attendant changes in the role of 
information professionals with respect to this important aspect of information practice. In 
particular, information professionals are now directing patrons to online health information 
resources, and at the same time taking up the new responsibility of assisting their patrons to 
identify on their own the best possible online resources. As a result, these professionals are faced 
on two fronts with fundamental issues of digital literacy: first, information professionals must 
themselves have the skills and expertise necessary to select the best possible online resources; 
second, they must support their patrons in developing those same skills. 
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One digital literacy issue that is increasingly significant for information professionals is 
that of user privacy, not only with respect to library practices regarding the collection and use of 
personal information (Burkell and Carey, 2011), but also with respect to the privacy challenges 
associated with the resources that consumers access online. Protecting users’ privacy is very 
important to librarians, and the issue is identified in the code of ethics of many library 
associations (e.g., Canadian Library Association, 1976). Librarians, from the earliest days of 
internet-based health resources, have worked to overcome barriers preventing consumers to make 
effective use of online health information (Cline and Haynes, 2001). They advise consumers who 
look online for health information to evaluate it with respect to factors such as intended audience, 
sponsorship, and information accuracy, currency and completeness (Fox and Rainie, 2002; 
Medical Library Association, n.d.). In helping users find good health information online, 
librarians have long advised them to pay attention to whether a health website includes 
advertisements (Medical Library Association, n.d.). These concerns about advertising are 
typically tied to the balance, coverage and objectivity of the information delivered on the site. 
More rarely, librarians advise users to read privacy policies for disclosure of collection and use of 
PII (e.g. MedlinePlus, n.d.). To date, however, information literacy guidelines have not addressed 
the privacy risks associated with behavioural tracking (Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada, 2011; 2012).  
As information professionals responsible for promoting the information literacy of the 
public, librarians should be aware that advertisers, using powerful data collection and profiling 
apparatus, can form a rich and nuanced portrait of Internet users — without the collection of any 
identifying information. This requires an understanding of behavioural tracking mechanisms and 
strategies, including “data optimization, ‘self-tuning’ algorithms, ‘intent’ data and ‘immersive’ 
multimedia” (Chester, 2012) that leverage information collected through cookies and beacons. In 
particular, information professionals should understand that user activity can be tracked across 
multiple websites, linking key aspects of Internet users’ digital identities into a comprehensive 
user profile. This understanding will support identification of privacy-respecting internet 
resources for recommendation to patrons, and also support digital literacy initiatives that will 
assist patrons in identifying privacy threats in the information they access online.  
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Behavioural Tracking Mechanisms 
Mechanisms for tracking a user’s activities online—and worries about potential privacy 
breaches they can allow—are not new. At their inception, HTTP cookies (cookies), which were 
originally introduced by Netscape in its Navigator 1.1 in the mid 1990s, were generating 
controversy about the potential invasion of privacy (Randall, 1997). HTTP cookies, however, are 
relatively easy for users to manage using accessible browser settings that limit or even entirely 
disallow the practice of setting cookies. As a result, websites, advertisers and others who benefit 
from web audience segmentation and behaviour analytics now deploy these mechanisms along 
with newer and more obscure tracking technologies including ‘supercookies’ and web beacons 
(Sipior, Ward and Mendoza, 2011). Cookies can be set by directly by the website (first-party 
cookies) or by advertising companies through ads embedded in first-party sites (third-party 
cookies). ‘Supercookies’ and web beacons, similarly, can be first-party or third-party 
mechanisms. First-party tracking mechanisms collect information about a site visit and visitor 
and deliver that information to the site itself. Using first-party tracking, web sites can provide 
personalized interaction, integrating visit and visitor information both within a single visit and 
across multiple visits. This information, however, is only available to the web site itself, and thus 
neither includes information about visits to other sites nor is accessible by other websites. Third-
party tracking mechanisms, by contrast, deliver information about a site visit and visitor to a third 
party, often an advertising company. Third-party tracking represents a greater menace to privacy, 
since third parties have a presence on multiple sites, and are able to collect information about 
users and their activities on all those sites and integrate that information across sites and across 
visits into a single detailed user profile (McDonald and Cranor ,2010). 
HTTP Cookies 
HTTP cookies (also known as browser cookies) were originally meant to help web 
developers gather information about users in order to personalize and optimize user experience 
(Randall, 1997). These cookies are simply a few lines of text shared in an HTTP transaction, and 
a typical cookie might include a user ID, the time of a visit, and the IP address of the computer. 
Cookies do not usually include identifying information such as name or address, and they are 
able to do so if an only if the user has explicitly provided this information to the website. When 
users want to access a web page, their browser sends a request to the server for the specific 
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website and the server searches the hard drive for a cookie file from this site. If there is no 
cookie, a unique identifier code is assigned to the browser and a cookie file is saved on the hard 
drive. If there is a cookie, the browser transfers the cookie file contents back to that site using the 
previously recorded identifier code (Harding, Reed and Gray, 2007).  
HTTP cookies can record visited pages, a user’s chosen values and all mouse-clicking 
choices. They also provide the server with information such as a user’s IP address, service 
provider, operating system and browser type (Harding, Reed and Gray, 2007). They enhance the 
experience of users in many ways and make the browsing experience more efficient. HTTP 
cookies can record the preferences of users on a web page and enable them to resume interaction 
with a website at the point where they were on the previous visit, which is the basis of site 
personalization. Using the IP address of a user, for instance, HTTP cookies can allow a website to 
display information relevant to the geographic area where a user is located. HTTP cookies also 
allow a website to remember registration details and the content users have put in their shopping 
basket (Harding, Reed and Gray, 2007). HTTP cookies inform webmasters of users’ movements 
on their websites: what pages are visited, how often they are visited, and in what order. They can 
also indicate the common entry and exit points for a specific website, information that can be 
used to increase user satisfaction and traffic. This information has obvious value for website 
optimization and personalization. At the same time, however, the detailed profile of user 
activities, potentially aggregated over multiple visits, presents potential privacy risks. The 
information stored in HTTP cookies can allow a website to know what topics or products are of 
particular interest for a user, and identify browsing and information access habits. 
Some HTTP cookies, called session or transient cookies, automatically expire at the end 
of a session. They are mainly used to keep track of what a consumer has added to a shopping cart 
or to allow users to navigate on a website without having to log in repeatedly. Other HTTP 
cookies, called permanent, persistent or stored cookies, are configured to keep track of users until 
the cookie reaches its expiration date, which be set many years after creation. Permanent HTTP 
cookies can be easily deleted using browser management tools (Sipior, Ward and Mendoza, 
2011). Studies have shown that over 30 percent of users delete cookies once a month (e.g 
Marshal, 2005). Such behaviour, however, displeases advertisers, as it leads to an overestimation 
of the number of true unique visitors on a website and impede user tracking (Abraham, 
Meierhoefer and Lipsman, 2007). 
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Local Shared Objects 
To palliate this ‘attack’ on HTTP cookies, an online advertising company, United 
Virtualities, developed a backup system for cookies: local shared objects (also known as Flash 
cookies), now a feature of Adobe’s Flash Player plug-in (Soltani et al., 2009). Unlike HTTP 
cookies, Flash cookies do not have an expiration date. They are also not handled by a browser, 
but are stored in a location accessible to different browsers and Flash widgets, which are thus all 
able to access the same cookie. Flash cookies represent a more resilient technology for tracking 
than HTTP cookies, and erasing traditional cookies within a browser does not affect Flash 
cookies (Soltani et al., 2009). Moreover, Flash cookies have the ability to ‘respawn’ (or recreate) 
deleted HTTP cookies, and a website using Flash cookies can therefore track users across 
sessions even if the user has taken reasonable steps to avoid this type of online profiling 
(Ayenson et al., 2011). 
Web Beacons 
Users’ online behaviour can also be monitored by beacons (also called web beacons or 
web bugs), which tiny are image tags embedded within the coding of a document placed on a 
website or an e-mail (Martin, Wu and Alsaid, 2003). The image tag creates a holding space for a 
referenced image residing on the Web, and beacons transmit information to a remote computer 
when the page is viewed. As with cookies, beacons can also be first- or third party (McDonald 
and Cranor, 2010). Unlike cookies, beacons are not tied to a specific server and, in the case of 
third-party beacons, can track users over multiple web sites (Schoen, 2009). User interaction on 
the web page, such as typed entries and mouse movement, can be tracked directly using beacons, 
and web beacons can also be retrieve information from a previously set cookie (Angwin, 2010). 
Such capacity means, according to the Privacy Foundation (2000), that beacons could potentially 
transfer to a third-party demographic data and personally identifiable information (name, address, 
phone number, email address, etc.) that a user has typed on a page.  
Objectives 
This research project seeks to document the tracking practices of consumer health 
websites that Canadians are likely to encounter. It also explores the disclosure of the collection of 
NPII in the privacy policies of these websites that engage in behavioural tracking. 
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Plan of the Report 
The first chapter analyzes the presence of behavioural tracking mechanisms on both 
English language and French language consumer health websites, and the disclosure of these 
practices on a subset of consumer health websites are documented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 
discusses strategies for detecting, mitigating, and neutralizing behavioural tracking. Chapter 4, 
finally, describes the activities that we have undertaken to disseminate these results to the various 
communities and presents future dissemination plans. 
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Chapter 1: Behavioural Tracking Practices 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyse the presence of behavioural tracking mechanisms on both 
English language and French language consumer health websites. The analysis of the English 
language websites contrasts websites recommended by health librarians to those retrieved using 
Google searches for the ten most commonly searched conditions on the Internet. In the absence 
of a recommended list of consumer health websites in French, the analysis of French language 
websites does not include this contrast. Instead, for the French language websites we report the 
tracking detected on relevant websites retrieved using Google searches for the ten most 
commonly searched conditions on the Internet. 
1.1 Methodology 
1.1.1 Sampling of the Websites 
For the English language websites, two sets of consumer health websites were identified: 
1. The consolidated set of websites recommended by the Consumer and Patient Health 
Information Section (CAPHIS) of the American Medical Library Association (2010) 
and the Consumer Health Information Providers Interest Group (CHIPIG) of the 
Canadian Health Libraries Association (2010; see Appendix I for a full list); 
2. The consolidated set of websites returned on the first two pages of Google searches of 
the ten most commonly searched conditions, as identified by the Pew Research 
Center’s Internet & American Life Project (Fox, 2011; see Table 1 for a list of these 
conditions). 
Obviously irrelevant results (e.g., sites for roofing companies that were returned for the ‘shingles’ 
search) were eliminated from the Google results, as were any sites that were included on the 
consolidated ‘recommended’ list. The Google searches were repeated three times using a 
different computer each time. The complete list of ‘Google Only’ websites used for the analysis 
can be found in Appendix II. 
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For the French language websites, in the absence of a recommended list of consumer 
health websites, the websites examined included the consolidated set of websites returned on the 
first two pages of Google searches of the ten most commonly searched conditions as identified by 
the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project (Fox, 2011). The ten conditions 
identified in that report were translated into French by the second author for the purposes of 
searching (see Table 1). Obviously irrelevant results (e.g., kijiji.ca was returned in a search for 
‘vésicule biliaire’) were eliminated from the results. The Google searches were repeated three 
times using a different computer each time, and all relevant returned websites were recorded. The 
complete consolidated list of websites used for the analysis can be found in Appendix III. 
Table 1 
The Ten Most Commonly Searched Conditions on the Internet (Fox 2011) 
Original conditions French translation 
Shingles Zona 
Gallbladder Vésicule biliaire 
Gout Goutte 
Hemorrhoids Hémorroïdes 
Lupus Lupus 
Skin problems Problèmes de peau 
Allergies Allergies 
Heart disease Maladie cardiaque 
Diabetes Diabète 
Sleep disorders Problèmes de sommeil 
1.1.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The data for each website (Recommended, Google Only, and French language) was 
collected separately, following a protocol that was developed to avoid any contamination of 
tracking results between the websites. Each website was visited in an independent session. Each 
session began with the browser at an about:blank page, with clean data directories (no HTTP and 
Flash cookies, and an empty cache). The website was then accessed directly by entering the 
domain name into the browser’s navigation bar. A typical user interaction with the website was 
mimicked by visiting approximately 10 pages on the site. Search functions on the site were used 
and any surveys that did not ask for personal information were completed (e.g., ‘Question of the 
day’ surveys). We did not click through on any ads or follow any external links; thus, user 
interaction was confined to the website in question.  
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At the end of the session, HTTP cookies in the browser cookie file were recorded along 
with any flash cookies stored in Adobe’s Website Storage Settings panel. These results were 
augmented by those returned by Ghostery4, a browser extension that records web beacons, and 
Charles5, an application that captures and analyzes data being sent between the browser and the 
visited website, and between the browser and third-party sites. Using these sources, we created a 
comprehensive list of the tracking mechanisms present on the site and the domains from which 
these trackers originated. After these data were recorded, the browser cache was cleared, all 
HTTP cookies were removed and the flash cookie folder was emptied using Adobe’s Website 
Storage Settings panel, in preparation for a new data collection session. In a separate session, 
each website was visited to identify a privacy policy; if a privacy policy was located, it was saved 
for later analysis.  
Once all data collection was complete, we created a consolidated list of third party 
tracking domains identified on all websites. Using a combination of results from Ghostery and 
PrivacyChoice6, we assigned each domain to one of two categories: third-party analytics, or third-
party advertisers7. The results provide an overview of third-party tracking presence on these 
consumer health websites, with additional separate focus on third-party advertising, since it is 
these trackers that create the greatest privacy risk. For the purpose of the analysis, we also 
divided websites into three categories: Government, Not-for-Profit (e.g., Alzheimer’s society) 
and Other (usually commercial sites).  
1.2 Results for English Language Websites 
The recommended lists from CAPHIS and CHIPIG yielded a total of 83 distinct consumer 
health information sites. The first two pages of the Google searches for the ten most commonly 
searched conditions yielded a total of 81 relevant websites that did not also appear on the 
recommended list. 
                                                
4 https://www.ghostery.com 
5 http://www.charlesproxy.com 
6 www.privacychoice.org/trackerlist 
7 We recognize that this determination is not always clearcut. For example, the distinction between third-party 
analytics companies and third-party advertisers is not always absolute (e.g., PrivacyChoice identifies Dataium as 
both an ad network and an analytics company). In general, for those cases where a domain undertook both types of 
activities, we identified it as an analytics rather than advertising domain, in order not to over-estimate the prevalence 
of third party advertising.  
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Third party behavioural tracking mechanisms were identified in the large majority of 
websites. Overall, 87% of the English language consumer health information websites included 
in the two samples had third party trackers, representing an average of 10 different domains for 
each site. Over half of the sites had trackers from third party advertisers, on average from 2 
different domains. Across all sites we identified trackers from a total of 230 different tracking 
domains, of which 23 were identified as advertisers (see Appendix IV for a list of all tracking 
domains identified in the website scans).  
1.2.1 Recommended vs. Google Only Sites 
Table 2 identifies the tracking domains that appear on more than 25% of all websites, 
indicating separately the presence of trackers from these domains on Recommended and Google 
Only sites. There was no difference between Recommended and Google Only sites with respect 
to the presence of third party tracking (X2(1)=0.3, n.s.). Among the 83 Recommended websites, 
86.7% (n=72) were associated with at least one tracking domain, compared to 87.7% (n=71) of 
the Google Only sites. Recommended sites, however, were significantly less likely to have third 
party advertisers: 41% (n=34) of Recommended sites had at least one third-party advertiser, 
compared to 61.7% (n=50) of Google Only sites (X2(1)=7.13, p<.01). We also examined the 
number of different domains represented on sites that had trackers present. Among those sites 
with third-party trackers, Recommended sites had trackers from an average of 13.1 domains, and 
Google Only sites had trackers from an average of 17.2 domains. The difference, however, only 
approached but did not reach significance (t(141)=1.82, p=.071). Among those sites with third-
party advertisers, Recommended sites had trackers from an average of 4.8 different domains, 
while Google Only sites had trackers from an average of 5.3 different domains. The difference 
was not significant (t(82)=4.89, n.s.). These results demonstrate that third party tracking on 
consumer health websites is widespread, and that Recommended websites show similar levels of 
tracking to Google Only sites, although the presence of third-party advertisers (as compared to all 
third party trackers) is lower on Recommended sites.  
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Table 2 
Common Tracking Domains (on more than 25% of sites) 
Cookie / Beacon Number in Recommended sites (% of sites) 
Number in ‘Google Only’ sites 
(% of sites) 
Third Party Trackers (All) 
 Google Analytics 60 (72.3%) 48 (59.3%) 
 Facebook 27 (32.5%) 30 (37.0%)  
 AddThis 29 (34.9%) 21 (25.9%) 
 ScorecardReesarch 23 (27.7%) 26 (32.1%) 
Third Party Advertising 
 DoubleClick 21 (25.3%) 38 (46.9%) 
 Microsoft Atlas Solutions 20 (24.1%) 24 (29.6%) 
 Google Adsense 11 (13.3%) 31 (38.3%) 
1.2.3 Government, Not-for-Profit, and Other Sites 
Considering all of the sites (Recommended and Google Only) in the sample, 18.3% 
(n=30) are Government sites, 32.3% (n=53) are Not-for-Profit sites, and 49.4% (n=81) are Other 
sites. When Recommended and Google Only sites are considered separately, significant 
differences emerge between the two groups (X2(2)=29.9, p<.001): among Recommended sites, 
30.1% (n=25) are Government sites, 39.8% (n=33) are Not-for-Profit sites, and 30.1% (n=25) are 
Other sites; among Google Only sites, 6.2% (n=5) are Government sites, 24.7% (n=20) are Not-
for-Profit sites, and 69.1% (n=56) are Other sites. Thus, other (including commercial) sites are far 
less likely to be included among those recommended by Library and Information science 
professionals compared to those returned by a Google search. 
Among the Government sites, 83.3% (n=25) have at least one tracker, compared to 86.8% 
(n=46) of the Not-for-Profit sites, and 88.9% (n=72) of the Other sites. Across the three groups, 
there is no significant difference in the presence of trackers (X2(2)=0.173, n.s.). The picture is 
quite different, however, when only advertising trackers are considered. Among Government 
sites, only 3.3% (n=1) had this type of tracker, compared to 49.1% (n=26) of Not-for-Profit sites, 
and 70.4% (n=57) of Other sites. The difference across types was significant (X2(2)=8.543, 
p<.001). The number of trackers present was compared across Government (average of 3.6), Not-
for-Profit (average of 6.4) and Other sites (average of 18.0); revealing a significant effect 
(F(2,140)=14.6, p<.001). Post-hoc tests (Tukey’s) revealed that Other sites have significantly more 
third-party trackers than either Government or Not-for-Profit sites, which do not differ from each 
other. We also compared the number of different advertising trackers present on Not-for-Profit 
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and Other sites (Government sites were eliminated from this analysis because only one had any 
advertising trackers). Among those sites with at least one advertising tracker, Not-for-Profit sites 
had an average of 2.8 advertising trackers, compared to 6.2 for Other sites; the difference is 
significant (t(81)=3,41, p<.01). Thus, Government sites have fewer third-party trackers than do 
Not-for-Profit and Other sites, which do not differ significantly from each other. Other sites also 
have significantly more third-party advertisers present on their sites than do websites Not-for-
Profit agencies. 
1.3 Results for French Language Websites 
The first two pages of the Google searches for the ten most commonly searched 
conditions yielded a total of 195 relevant French language websites. The presence of behavioural 
tracking was identified in the large majority of websites. Overall, 91% (n=179) of the consumer 
health websites included in the sample had third party trackers, representing an average of 13 
different domains for each site. Forty percent (n=78) of the sites had trackers from third party 
advertisers, on average from 2.4 different domains. Across all sites we identified trackers from a 
total of 251 different tracking domains, of which 25 were advertisers (see Appendix IV for a list 
of all tracking domains identified in the website scans). 
Among the French language websites, 17.1% (n=33) were Government sites, 20.2% 
(n=39) were Not-for-Profit sites, and 62.7% (n=121) were Other sites. When looking at the 
presence of third-party trackers, significant differences were present across the three categories 
(X2(2)=16.909, p<.001). Results indicate that Other websites (including commercial) are more 
likely to contain third party trackers (75.8% (n=25) of Government sites have third-party trackers 
compared to 84.6% (n=33) of Not-for-Profit sites and 97.5% (n=118) of other sites). The number 
of trackers present was compared across Government (average of 2.3), Not-for-Profit (average of 
6.0) and Other sites (average of 18.2). The difference was significant (F(2,173)=11.396, p<.001), 
and post-hoc tests (Tukey’s) indicate that other sites have significantly more third-party tracking 
domains than do either Government or Not-for-Profit sites, which do not differ from each other. 
Significant differences were also be found when looking at the presence of advertisers 
(X2(2)=43.251 p<.001): among Government sites 3% (n=1) have advertising trackers, compared to 
17.9% (n=7) of Not-for-Profit sites and 53.7% (n=65) Other sites. We contrasted the number of 
advertisers present on Not-for-Profit and Other sites (government sites were eliminated because 
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only one had any tracking by third-party advertisers). The results indicate that Other sites have 
significantly more third-party advertisers (7.0) than do Not-for-Profit websites (3.57; 
t(9.905)=2.858, p<.058). Table 3 identifies the tracking domains that appear on more than 25% of 
all websites, and identifies the proportion of French language websites that have trackers from 
each of these domains. Overall, the results for French language sites mirror those for English 
language sites: third party tracking is widespread, occurring on the vast majority of sites. 
Tracking by third-party advertisers, while less prevalent, is still common. Commercial sites show 
the highest levels of tracking by third-party advertisers.  
 
Table 3 
Common Tracking Domains (on more than 25% of sites) 
Cookie / Beacon Number (% of sites) 
Third Party Trackers (All) 
 AddThis 56 (28.7%) 
 Facebook 93 (47.7%) 
 Google +1 61 (31.3 %) 
 Media6Degrees 55 (28.2%) 
 Twitter 58 (29.7%) 
Third Party Advertising 
 DoubleClick 69 (35.4%) 
 Google Adsense 57 (29.2%) 
Conclusion 
The results of this research demonstrate that third-party behavioural tracking is present on 
the large majority (at least 4 out of 5) of English and French language consumer health websites, 
and almost half of consumer health websites have trackers from third-party advertisers (50% of 
English sites, 40% of French sites). Furthermore, the English language websites recommended by 
library associations are not significantly better with respect to third party tracking, although these 
sites do show lower levels of tracking by third-party advertisers. Government sites (both French 
and English) show high levels of third party tracking (4 out of 5 English government sites and 3 
out of 4 French government sites), but they are much less likely to include trackers by third-party 
advertisers (less than 5% of both French and English language government sites have one or 
more advertising trackers). ‘Other’ (primarily commercial) sites show the highest levels of third-
                                                
8 Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant (F=4.084, p<.05, so equal variances were not assumed).  
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party trackers (well over 4 out of 5 French language and English language sites in this category 
have at least one third-party tracker) and they are most likely to include trackers from third-party 
advertisers (over half French language and English language sites in this category have trackers 
from at least one third-party advertiser). Thus, government consumer health websites are 
relatively free from tracking by third-party advertisers, but ‘other’ sites show relatively high 
levels of this type of tracking, with not-for-profit sites falling in between these two categories.  
It is evident from these results that consumers seeking health information on the Internet 
are very likely to be subject to third-party tracking of their health information seeking behaviours. 
It is important, therefore, to examine privacy policies to determine whether a consumer could 
effectively learn, from reading those policies, about the tracking activities present on the websites 
they visit.  
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Chapter 2: Disclosure of Behavioural Tracking in Privacy Policies 
Introduction 
There exist, as discussed in the introduction, a variety of privacy guidelines have 
regulating the collection, retention and use of personal information in the online environment. 
One important aspect of these regulatory frameworks is the requirement for notice: users should 
be given notice of website practices with respect to the collection and use of personal 
information. This notice is typically provided in privacy policies that identify what information is 
collected, how it is used, and with whom it is shared. 
In general, regulatory frameworks did not originally contemplate the collection of NPII, 
and instead were focused on the regulation of the collection and use of personally identifiable 
information. Although there is no explicit and universal requirement that users be apprised of the 
collection and use of NPII, such a provision would seem to be consistent with FIPs and other 
guidelines, and in the US new Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Online Behavioral Advertising 
identify the need to provide notice to users when behavioural data is collected that allows the 
tracking of users across websites and over time (United States Federal Trade Commission, 2009). 
Indeed, within the Self-Regulatory Guidelines it is noted that with changes in technology and 
increasingly powerful data analytic techniques the distinction between PII and NPII becomes 
“less and less meaningful and should not, by itself, determine the protections provided for 
consumer data.” (United States Federal Trade Commission, 2009, p. 21-22). The Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada has also determined that PIPEDA protections extend in at least 
some circumstances to NPII, therefore requiring notice of these data collection practices in at 
least some circumstances. Thus, there seems to be general agreement that users should be 
informed of behavioural tracking measures active on the websites they visit. 
Website privacy policies are often difficult to understand (Micheti, Burkell, & Steeves, 
2010), apparently written with the goal of protecting a website owner against lawsuits rather than 
informing users (Earp et al. 2005; Pollach, 2005). Pollach (2005), for example, details a variety 
of linguistic strategies that serve to undermine user understanding of website practices, including 
mitigation and enhancement, obfuscation of reality, relationship building, and persuasive appeals. 
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Thus, it is legitimate and indeed important to examine whether the privacy policies of websites 
engaged in behavioural tracking effectively disclose these practices, particularly in the case of 
websites recommended by library and information science professionals. 
In this chapter, we analyse disclosure of behavioural tracking practices on a subset of 
consumer health information websites. For the English language websites, these sites represent a 
purposive sample of the recommended sites: third party trackers were observed on all selected 
sites, and the set includes government and commercial sources, encompassing sites with 
relatively low levels of tracking (e.g., Mayo Clinic), as well as those with much higher levels 
(e.g., What to Expect; see Burkell and Fortier, 2013). For the French language sites, these sites 
represent the French language versions of the two sites that were recommended in the English 
language recommended lists and also appeared in the Google results (Cancer.ca and 
PasseportSante.net) plus four other websites purposively selected for the presence of third party 
trackers. These include not-for-profit and commercial sources and encompass sites with relatively 
low levels of tracking (e.g., FmCoeur.qc.ca), as well as sites with much higher levels of tracking 
(e.g., Vulgaris-Medical.com). 
2.1 Methodology 
Seven English language websites and six French language websites were selected (see 
Tables 4 and 5). Their privacy policies were examined qualitatively for disclosure of first- and 
third-party tracking mechanisms and NPII data collection. The analysis draws on the critical 
linguistics approach used by Pollach (2005), particularly focusing on linguistic strategies used for 
mitigation and enhancement and obfuscation of reality. These include the use of: 
• Qualitative adjectives that emphasize or de-emphasize specific qualities; 
• Temporal adverbs (e.g., ‘occasionally’ or ‘occasionnellement’) that downplay frequency; 
• Conditional verbs (e.g., ‘may’ or ‘pourrait’) or structures that introduce uncertainty; 
• Nominalizations (e.g., ‘the collection of data’ or ‘la collecte de données’) and the passive 
voice (e.g., ‘data are collected’ or ‘les données sont collectées’) that obscure agency.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the websites selected for the analysis along with a summary of 
tracking mechanisms found on these websites. 
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Table 4 
English Language Websites Used the Analysis of Privacy Policies 
Website Number of first party cookies Number of third party cookies Number of beacons 
WhatToExpect.com 17 
(6 sessional, 11 persistent, valid for 
up to 2 years) 
119 
(most persistent, valid for up to 33 
years) 
40 
MedicineNet.com 18 
(13 sessional, 6 persistent, valid for 
up to 17 years, 1 flash cookie) 
118 
(most persistent, valid for up to 3 
years) 
37 
HealthyWoman.org 7  
(2 sessional, 5 persistent, valid for up 
to 2 years) 
42 
(all persistent, valid for up to 2 
years) 
12 
MayoClinic.com 11 
(4 sessional, 9 persistent, valid for up 
to 30 years) 
40 
(all persistent, valid for up to 2 
years) 
9 
FamilyDoctor.org 18 
(9 sessional, 9 persistent, valid up to 
5 years) 
36  
(all persistent, valid for up to 2 
years) 
15 
MedHelp.org 8 
(6 sessional, 2 persistent, valid for up 
to 15 years) 
14 
(all persistent, valid for up to 2 
years) 
10 
Feminist.com 4  
(1 sessional, 3 persistent, valid for up 
to 2 years) 
13 
(all persistent, valid for up to 6 
months) 
5 
 
Table 5 
French Language Websites Used in the Analysis of Privacy Policies 
Website Number of first party cookies Number of third party cookies Number of beacons 
PasseportSante.net 8 
(4 sessional, 4 persistent, valid for 
up to 2 years) 
115 
(most persistent, valid for up to 10 
years) 
51 
Vulgaris-
Medical.com 
11 
(2 sessional, 9 persistent, valid for 
up to 10 years) 
262 
(most persistent, valid for up to 10 
years) 
96 
TopSante.com 15 
(3 sessional, 12 persistent, valid for 
up to 2 years) 
91 
(most persistent, valid for up to 10 
years) 
66 
InfoBebes.com 10 
(1 sessional, 9 persistent, valid for 
up to 2 years) 
218 
(most persistent, valid for up to 30 
years) 
75 
FmCoeur.qc.ca 21 
(16 sessional, 5 persistent, valid up 
to 6 years) 
46  
(most persistent, valid for up to 14 
years) 
24 
Cancer.ca 11 
(5 sessional, 6 persistent, valid for 
up to 2 years) 
55 
(most persistent, valid for up to 5 
years) 
22 
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2.2 Results for English language websites 
Each of the selected websites sets first-party cookies, both sessional (i.e. deleted when the 
browser is closed) and persistent (stored on a user’s hard drive until its expiration date). The 
minimum number of first-party cookies observed was 4 (Feminist.com), and the maximum 
number was 18 (medicine.net and FamilyDoctor.org). Each website had at least one persistent 
first party cookie that lasted for 2 years or longer, and one site (MayoClinic.com) set a persistent 
first party cookie that lasted for 30 years. In addition, the seven selected health information sites 
set between 119 (WhatToExpect.com) and 13 (Feminist.com) third party cookies, and included 
between 40 (WhatToExpect.com) and 5 (Feminist.com) beacons. At least one advertiser 
(DoubleClick, AddThis, etc.) was included among the third parties present on each of the sites. 
Thus, we know that at every one of the selected sites users are subject to first party behavioural 
tracking as well as third party tracking by various entities including advertising agencies using 
both cookies and web beacons to monitor user behaviour. 
2.2.1 Analysis of Privacy Policies 
We analyzed the privacy policies of each of the seven websites for disclosure regarding 
behavioural tracking practices. One site (Feminist.com) had a very short ‘privacy’ policy (less 
than one page) that did not actually address any privacy issues. In our testing, this website 
showed the lowest level of behavioural tracking among the seven selected sites (see Table 1). 
Nonetheless, there was plenty to disclose, since this website does participate in third party 
behavioural tracking, setting first party cookies that persist for up to 2 years, and third party 
cookies that persist for up to six months. It is therefore notable that they make no attempt to 
disclose this behavioural tracking in their privacy policy. The remainder of this analysis 
addresses the six policies that included some discussion of privacy issues. 
2.2.2 Notice of NPII Collection 
We first examined each of the remaining privacy policies for explicit discussion of the 
collection of NPII, using the keywords ‘collect’, ‘gather’, or ‘log’. Each of the six policies had 
some direct mention of first party collection of NPII, while five of the six policies explicitly 
discussed third party collection of this type of information.  
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In some cases, disclosures about first-party collection of NPII are explicit and easy to 
follow. FamilyDoctor.org (AAFP) has a particularly clear disclosure, identifying that they collect 
NPII, and telling the user what information this entails. This list appears early in the privacy 
policy under the heading ‘What information does the AAFP collect?’:  
The following information is collected from all visitors to AAFP Web 
sites and is recorded in a log file: 
• Time and date of the visit 
• The Internet address of the computer 
• The browser and operating system used 
• The page that is viewed 
• The previous page that was visited 
Note the use of the third person (‘What information does the AAFP collect?’) and the passive 
voice; these linguistic strategies serve to reduce the perceived agency of the website with respect 
to NPII collection. 
Among the remaining sites, WhatToExpect.com provides the clearest disclosure, but the 
indication of what information is collected is scattered throughout the privacy policy and is cast 
in conditional language. Under the heading ‘Information we collect through your use of the Site’, 
the privacy policy includes the following:  
As you use the Site and Services, certain information may also be 
passively collected. Through cookies, pixels, beacons, log files and other 
technologies, we may collect information about how you use the Site and 
the Services. For example we may determine through an IP address that a 
particular computer or device is located in New York City and we may 
use this information to deliver advertisements promoting New York City-
based businesses. 
The user is then directed to another part of the policy (‘Cookies and Targeted Advertising’) for 
further information. Under that heading, this text appears: 
We may … gather information regarding the date and time of your visit, 
the features and information for which you searched and viewed, the 
email you opened, or on which advertisements you clicked. 
The other sites provide less detailed disclosure about this type of first party data 
collection. The Mayo clinic, for example, acknowledges that they ‘collect and log the Internet 
Protocol address (IP) of all visitors to MayoClinic.com’, following later with the information that 
they use cookies to ‘provide us with information relating to the sources of our site traffic’. 
MedHelp.org similarly indicates that they collect non-personal information ‘about your use of our 
website and your use of the Web sites of selected sponsors and advertisers’. MedicineNet.com 
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indicates that they ‘may collect “Non-Personal Information”’— information that cannot be used 
to identify you’, and later in the policy they state that they ‘collect Non-Personal Information 
about your use of the WebMD Web Sites and your use of other web sites…’. HealthyWoman.org 
also explicitly acknowledges the collection of IP addresses, and they later acknowledge that they 
‘may collect’ information about ‘your use of the Website’. 
Not surprisingly, explicit disclosures of third party NPII collection were less frequent and 
more limited, at least in part because (correctly) the sites indicate that they do not control the 
practices of the third parties that are active (with permission, obviously) on their websites. At the 
same time, it is critical to recall that the tracking measures we documented occurred in the 
process of regular browsing on the sites: in particular, we did not ‘click through’ on any 
advertisements or link to any outside sites. Thus, while the sites do not control the behaviour of 
the third parties with respect to the NPII that is collected, they certainly control the presence of 
those third parties on the website, and thus the ability of those third parties to collect personal 
information.  
Five of the six policies make at least some mention of third party NPII collection. Two of 
these disclosures (MayoClinic.com and MedHelp.org) were quite detailed, providing the reader 
with a list of the NPII collected by third parties, including browser type, operating system, Web 
pages visited, time of visits, content viewed, ads viewed, and ‘other clickstream data’; while 
MayoClinic.com indicates that third party advertisers collect this information, MedHelp.org notes 
only that they may collect it. In another section, however, their policy indicates that MedHelp.org 
‘receives’ (from where or whom is not indicated) NPII, including 
your IP address, the URLs of sites from which you link to or leave our 
website, your type of browser and ISP. 
Under the heading ‘Information Collected by Third Party Advertisers’, WhatToExpect.com 
includes the following:  
‘Advertisers or other third parties on the Sites may also engage in 
Behavioral Advertising and use cookies and web beacons in the manner 
described above.’  
One must infer that the ‘text above’ refers to this passage, appearing earlier in the document 
under the heading ‘targeted advertising’:  
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‘These third party vendors may connect information about pages you visit 
on our Sites with information about pages you visit on other websites and 
show you advertising based on this combined information.’  
Note, however, that the verb used here is ‘connect’, leaving open the question of what data are 
collected and by whom; moreover, conditional language is used once again to describe third party 
collection (‘may also engage’).  
In the privacy policies of two sites (FamilyDoctor.org, MedicineNet.com) disclosure 
about third party NPII collection is limited to the assertion that collection is limited to NPII, or 
that there is no collection of PII by third parties (without explicit acknowledgement that NPII is 
collected by these third parties). No further details are provided in these cases.  
We also examined the privacy policies for oblique disclosure of the collection of NPII 
(first or third-party). In this case, we were looking for text in the privacy policy that provided to 
the user an indication of the NPII that the website or third party had or used, without explicit 
discussion of the actual collection of that information. Thus, in some cases a user could infer first 
or third-party NPII collection through careful reading of the policy for these oblique references. 
Although MayoClinic.com explicitly identifies only the collection of IP address (see above), they 
acknowledge elsewhere in their policy the use (and therefore, necessarily, prior collection) of 
additional NPII including ‘traffic patterns’, ‘site usage’, and ‘length of stay’. MedicineNet.com 
acknowledges that they ‘statistically analyze user behaviour and activity including how 
frequently areas of the site are visited’: from this, the user can surmise that MedicineNet.com 
retains information about user visits that includes both the page(s) visited and the date of any 
visit. Similarly, HealthyWoman.org indicates that cookies enable them ‘to track site navigation, 
such as what sections users are visiting and how long they stay there’, while they explicitly 
acknowledge only the collection of IP address. 
There were relatively few oblique references to NPII collection by third parties. 
MedHelp.org notes in their policy that “third-party advertisers can see the content of any page on 
the MedHelp website, with the exception of Personal Health Records”, indicating that advertisers 
‘target ads based on the content of those pages but do not store any personally identifiable 
information.’ It is unclear from this passage whether NPII (including the page visited) is stored 
by the advertisers, but it is evident that this information is at the very least used for contextual 
advertising that is selected on the basis of the page the user is currently visiting. 
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WhatToExpect.com acknowledges that third parties ‘may’ use cookies to understand ‘web usage 
patterns’, but they leave it up to the user to infer the type of information that would be required to 
support this understanding.  
2.2.3 Notice of Behavioural Tracking Mechanisms 
Each of the website privacy policies provides a definition of the term ‘cookie’; none, 
however, includes an explicit discussion of web beacons. FamilyDoctor.org offers the most 
comprehensive discussion: 
Cookies are a technology used by the AAFP to identify a user as the user 
moves through the AAFP Web sites. The user's browser allows the AAFP 
to place some information on the user's hard drive that identifies the 
computer utilized. Two types of cookies are commonly used. A session 
cookie is a temporary file stored in memory on the user's computer drive 
whenever a Web site is accessed and is terminated by closing the browser. 
A persistent cookie is a file stored on the user's hard drive that may be 
deleted manually by the user or expired by the Web server.  
Three of the websites offer only a very brief definition, identifying cookies as ‘small data files’ or 
‘small pieces of information’ that are stored or placed on the user’s computer. In each of these 
three cases, a minimizing adjective is used to describe the information collected, suggesting that 
this information (and therefore any privacy risk it entails) is negligible.  
HealthyWoman.org provides a more detailed description, one that is inconsistent with the 
description provided by the other sites: 
When you logon to the Website, a cookie is generated on the server, or 
the machine that hosts the site. The cookie is a randomly generated 
number that does not include any of your Personal Information. This 
randomly generated number or cookie remains on the server machine, not 
on your computer, until you leave the site. When you visit the Website 
again, a different, unique randomly generated number or cookie is 
assigned. 
This description includes some misleading or even factually inaccurate statements (e.g., the 
‘cookie remains on the server machine’). Moreover, the emphasis on the ‘random’ nature of the 
cookie, paired with the assertion that the cookie ‘does not include any of your Personal 
Information’ suggests to the user that cookies have little if anything to do with them, yet nothing 
could be further from the truth. 
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All six of the privacy policies discuss the use of first party cookies for behavioural 
tracking, most identifying the use of this information as a basis for improving user experience on 
the website. This disclosure, on FamilyDoctor.org is typical (if a little more detailed than some):  
The AAFP uses cookies on areas of its Web sites to personalize a 
member's visit, to offer greater functionality, and to track visitor 
practices. The information generated from these cookies is used to help 
determine which services are most important and guide editorial 
decisions. 
MayoClinic.com notes that their practice is ‘like many websites’, while MedHelp.org as well as 
HealthyWomen.org and WhatToExpect.com emphasize the benefits that users experience as a 
result of the use of cookies. MedicineNet.com is the only website that conditionalizes their 
disclosure regarding the use of first party cookies, noting that they ‘may collect non-personal 
information… via cookies’; in another part of the policy, however, they indicate that they do 
collect information (about the use of the website) through cookies. Interestingly, 
WhatToExpect.com indicates that: 
As you use the Site and Services, certain information may also be 
passively collected. 
This is a surprising (or perhaps inaccurate) use of language, since it is the provision of the 
information, and not the collection, that is passive. 
Four of the six policies acknowledge the use of third party cookies and web beacons on 
their sites, although they use conditional language to describe these practices. These disclosures 
run from the minimalist (WhatToExpect.com): 
Advertisers or other third parties on the Sites may also engage in 
Behavioral Advertising and use cookies and web beacons in the manner 
described above.  
to the relatively comprehensive (MayoClinic.com): 
.. third party network advertisers, along with other advertisers and 
sponsors on the website, may use cookies, Web beacons (also called 
single pixel GIFs or action tags) or similar technologies (and, in the case 
of cookies, access them on your computer if you choose to have cookies 
enabled in your browser) to serve you advertisements tailored to interests 
you have shown by browsing on this and other sites you have visited, to 
determine whether you have seen a particular advertisement before, to 
avoid sending you duplicated advertisements and to serve you 
advertisements on other sites. In doing so, the provider collects non-
personal data such as your browser type, your operating system, Web 
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pages visited, time of visits, content viewed, ads viewed and other 
clickstream data. 
All four of these policies correctly identify that the collection and use of NPII by third parties is 
controlled by the privacy policy of the third party site. This statement, in the MayoClinic.com 
privacy policy, is typical: 
The use of third party cookies, Web beacons and similar technologies by 
these ad network providers is governed by each third party's specific 
privacy policy, not this one. 
None of the sites, however, explicitly indicates to the user that this third party NPII 
collection occurs during simple browsing on the website, and does not require clickthrough on an 
ad or hyperlink to another website. Given that the text of the policies explicitly indicates that the 
third parties control the NPII that is collected, users might be forgiven for assuming that the data 
collection itself is activated if and only if the user interacts directly with that third party. It is also 
worth noting the use of conditional language to describe deployment of third party cookies and 
web beacons. Every policy that mentioned these techniques used the term ‘may’ to describe their 
use, even though the site itself allows the web beacons and third party cookies to operate, and 
indeed must have included the relevant code in their own web page. Thus, the conditional 
language serves only to obfuscate the actual practice on the sites.  
Five of the six policies (the policy for MedHelp.com was the sole exception) offer 
information about opting out of first party cookies. In every case, there is an accompanying 
warning that opting out could reduce the website functionality and compromise browsing 
experience. Thus, for example, MayoClinic.com indicates “If you reject cookies from our site, 
some parts of the site may not work properly for you’. Three of these policies provide some 
(limited) information to users about how to reject cookies, directing users to the ‘help’ section in 
their browser toolbar. It is worth noting that none of the website privacy policies acknowledge 
that opt-outs limit only collection of NPII through traditional cookies, and thus do not affect web 
beacons or other newer mechanisms (e.g., flash cookies). Without this information, the policies 
could lead users to incorrectly assume that by refusing cookies they are stopping all NPII 
collection.  
Four of the sites provide information on how to opt out of third party cookies, directing 
users to the privacy policy of the third party in question (e.g., Google, or DoubleClick) or to the 
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Network Advertising Initiative. Thus, the privacy policies typically send users to outside sites for 
additional information about data collection practices and information about user choices; only 
after receiving this information from an outside source can the user choose to opt out of third 
party tracking. 
2.3 Results for French Language Websites 
Each of the selected French language websites also sets first-party cookies, both sessional 
and persistent. The minimum number of first-party cookies observed was 8 (PasseportSante.net) 
and the maximum number was 21 (FmCoeur.qc.ca). Each website had at least one persistent first 
party cookie that lasted for 2 years or longer, and one site (Vulgaris-Medical.com) set a persistent 
first party cookie that lasted for 10 years. In addition, the six selected health information sites set 
between 46 (FmCoeur.qc.ca) and 262 (Vulgaris-Medical.com) third party cookies, and included 
between 22 (Cancer.ca) and 96 (Vulgaris-Medical.com) beacons. At least one advertiser 
(DoubleClick, AddThis, etc.) was included among the third parties present on each of the sites. 
Thus, we know that at every one of the selected sites users are subject to first party behavioural 
tracking as well as third party tracking by advertising agencies using both cookies and web 
beacons to monitor user behaviour. 
2.3.1. Notice of NPII Collection 
We first examined each of the privacy policies for explicit discussion of the collection of 
NPII. Only three of the six policies (FmCoeur.qc.ca, Vulgaris-Medical.com and TopSante.com) 
had some direct mention of first party collection of NPII and none explicitly discussed third party 
collection of this type of information. Somewhat surprisingly, no disclosure of third party NPII 
collection is made in any of the policies. 
FmCoeur.qc.ca had the clearest disclosure of first-party NPII collection, indicating that 
the IP address, the internet provider, the time of the visit, the webpage from which the user 
accessed the website, the operating system and all the content seen on the website might be 
automatically recorded: 
Il est possible que les sites Web recueillent automatiquement certains 
renseignements non identificatoires au sujet de leurs utilisateurs, 
notamment l’adresse IP de leur ordinateur, l’adresse IP de leur fournisseur 
d’accès Internet, la date et l’heure à laquelle ils ont accédé aux sites Web, 
l’adresse URL du site à partir duquel ils se sont rendus directement aux 
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sites Web, le système d’exploitation qu’ils utilisent, les sections du site 
Web qu’ils consultent, les pages des sites Web qu’ils ont lues et les 
images qu’ils ont vues, ainsi que les documents qu’ils affichent sur les 
sites Web ou qu’ils téléchargent à partir de ceux-ci. Les renseignements 
non identificatoires sont utilisés pour l’exploitation de nos services Web, 
le maintien de la qualité des services et la compilation de statistiques 
générales au sujet de l’utilisation de nos services Web.  
Note the use of the third person (“les sites Web”) and a conditional structure (“Il est possible 
que”); these linguistic strategies serve to reduce the perceived agency of the website with respect 
to first party NPII collection. 
Vulgaris-Medical.com and TopSante.com are much more succinct in their disclosure of 
the collection of NPII. Vulgaris-Medical.com indicates only that the webpage from which the 
user accessed the website, the internet provider and the IP address are recorded (we cannot 
determine exactly what NPII the site collects): 
A l'occasion de l'utilisation du site www.vulgaris-medical.com, sont 
notamment recueillies les informations suivantes qui ne sont pas 
considérées comme personnelles (les « Informations Non Personnelles »): 
• l'adresse Internet URL des liens par l'intermédiaire desquels 
l'Utilisateur a accédé au site www.vulgaris-medical.com 
• le fournisseur d'accès de l'Utilisateur. 
A l'occasion de l'utilisation du site www.vulgaris-medical.com, est 
recueillie l'adresse de protocole Internet (IP) de l'Utilisateur l'information 
qui est considérée comme une Information Personnelle par une partie de 
la jurisprudence et par la CNIL. 
Top-Sante.com indicates that “one cookie” is placed on the user computer, recording information 
that will be used in the future such as the pages visited and time of the visit, but they do not 
provide an explicit list of recorded information: 
topsante.com vous informe qu'un cookie est placé dans votre ordinateur 
lorsque vous naviguez sur son site. Un cookie ne nous permet pas de vous 
identifier. De manière générale, il enregistre des informations relatives à 
la navigation de votre ordinateur sur notre site (les pages que vous avez 
consultées, la date et l'heure de la consultation, etc.) que nous pourrons 
lire lors de vos visites ultérieures. 
Although these sites do not use linguistic strategies to reduce the perceived agency of the website 
with respect to NPII collection, both sites provide only a partial list of the NPII that is collected 
(the lists are qualified by ‘notamment’ and etc.).  
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The three other websites provide less detailed disclosure about this type of first party data 
collection. PasseportSante.net, for instance, indicates that they may record “audience measures”, 
such as number of pages visited and user activities, through cookies: 
Afin de vous assurer le meilleur service possible, nous pourrions être 
amenés à procéder à des mesures d'audience de notre site (nombre de 
pages vues, activité des visiteurs etc.) via la technologie des cookies. 
The other websites, Cancer.ca and InfoBebes.com, only mention that they automatically collect 
“data” to improver their website without mentioning what information is collected. 
No disclosure of third party NPII collection is made in any of the policies. Only two 
websites, PasseportSante.net and TopSante.com, mention that NPII could be linked to 
advertisement. PasseportSante.net indicates that cookies are used for ends linked to 
advertisement: 
Les cookies sont alors utilisés notamment pour des finalités liées à la 
publicité […] 
Top-Sante.com indicates that NPII can be used to limit the number of times a user sees an 
advertisement (clearly a form of targeting): 
[…] de limiter éventuellement le nombre de délivrance d'une même 
bannière publicitaire à un même utilisateur. 
PasseportSante.net also mentions that it is possible to block third-party cookies, without 
mentioning them elsewhere in the policy, and thus not disclosing that these cookies are being set, 
how they are being used, etc.  
2.3.2 Notice of Behavioural Tracking Mechanisms 
Five of the privacy policies provide a definition of the term ‘cookie’; none, however, 
mentions web beacons. Moreover, none of them provides a comprehensive discussion about 
cookies. Cancer.ca provides the most thorough definition: 
Un témoin est un petit fichier de données que le serveur d’une page Web 
transfère dans votre navigateur et qui ne peut être lu que par le serveur qui 
vous l’a transmis. Il s’agit en fait d’une « carte d’identité »; ce fichier 
n’est pas un programme et ne peut servir à exécuter un code informatique 
ou être porteur d’un virus. La Société n'analyse pas et ne rapporte pas sur 
les sessions personnelles d’un utilisateur, et ne redirige jamais les témoins 
vers d'autres serveurs. 
While accurate, this definition does not mention the different types of cookies (session or 
permanent, first- and third-party, etc.). Passeport-Sante-net, Vulgaris-Medical.com and 
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FmCoeur.qc.ca offer only a very brief definition, identifying cookies as ‘small data files’ or 
‘small pieces of information’ that are stored or placed on the user’s computer. In each of these 
three cases, a minimizing adjective is used to describe the information collected, suggesting that 
this information (and therefore any privacy risk it entails) is negligible. Interestingly, Top-
sante.com indicates — inaccurately according to our results — that “one cookie” is set when 
navigating its website, while at the same time failing to define the term: 
topsante.com vous informe qu'un cookie est placé dans votre ordinateur 
lorsque vous naviguez sur son site. 
Another inaccuracy can be found the policy of Passeport-Sante.net, where it is mentioned that 
cookies will only last for one year (data indicate at least one first-party cookie on this website 
was set to last for two years). Finally, InfoBebes.com does not mention cookies in its privacy 
policy. 
Three of the six policies (Vulgaris-Merical.com, Top-Sante.com and Passeport-sante.net) 
offer information about rejecting cookies. Passeport-sante.net provides the most complete 
information, indicating that users can refuse all cookies or third-party cookies:  
Nous informons les internautes que les versions récentes des principaux 
navigateurs permettent non seulement de s'opposer à l'enregistrement de 
cookies mais également d'effectuer des sessions de navigation à l'issue 
desquelles tous les cookies installés lors de cette session sont 
automatiquement effacés indépendamment de leur durée de vie prévue, 
offrant ainsi une meilleur protection des traces.  
Ces derniers disposent encore d'outils permettant de gérer les cookies et 
notamment:  
• de bloquer les cookies issus de sites "tiers", c'est à dire ceux qui 
sont affichés par un autre site que celui qui affiche le contenu 
principal,  
• de créer des "listes noires" de sites pour lesquels il faut bloquer les 
cookies. 
The two other websites only mention that it is possible to use the browser setting to manage 
cookies. It is worth noting that none of the website privacy policies acknowledge that opt-outs 
limit only collection of NPII through traditional cookies, and thus do not affect web beacons or 
other newer mechanisms (e.g., flash cookies). Without this information, the policies could lead 
users to incorrectly assume that by refusing cookies they are stopping all NPII collection.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we analyzed the disclosure, in two sets of website privacy policies, of the 
collection of non-personally identifiable information (NPII). The websites selected all engage in 
first and third party behavioural tracking using cookies and web beacons. For the English 
language websites, these sites represent a purposive sample of the recommended sites and they 
include government and commercial sources, encompassing sites with relatively low levels of 
tracking as well as those with much higher levels. For the French language sites, these sites 
represent the French language versions of two sites that appeared in the English recommended 
lists as well as the Google results plus four other websites purposively selected where third party 
trackers were observed. These include not-for-profit and commercial sources and encompass sites 
with relatively low levels of tracking as well as sites with much higher levels of tracking. 
Our focus in this chapter was an analysis of the disclosure of these practices. Such 
disclosure is not generally required under regulatory frameworks stemming from Fair 
Information Practice Principles (such as PIPEDA) except insofar as this information is deemed 
to be personally identifiable. Nonetheless, disclosure of NPII collection falls within the spirit of 
the underlying guidelines (e.g., Fair Information Practice Principles), which are designed to 
protect user privacy in online spaces. Moreover, disclosure is required under self-regulatory 
principles (e.g., United States Federal Trade Commission, 2009), newer privacy regulations (e.g., 
the 2009 EU directive 2009/136/EC), and newer interpretations of existing guidelines (e.g., the 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada Policy Position on Online Behavioural 
Advertising). It is relevant to ask, therefore, whether privacy policies effectively disclose 
behavioural tracking practices. 
The majority of the French and English language privacy policies we analysed (10 of 13) 
include at least some disclosure of first party behavioural tracking, but less than half of them (5 
of 13) acknowledge behavioural tracking on their websites by third parties. The effectiveness of 
this disclosure furthermore is limited by the use of complex language, and passive and sometimes 
conditional grammatical constructions (see Pollach, 2005). The majority of the policies (11 of 13) 
also provide some information about behavioural tracking mechanisms, including the fact that 
users can opt-out of cookies (8 of 13). While opt-out information is important and in fact required 
in emerging regulatory frameworks (e.g., EU Directive 2009/136/EC), the direct pairing of opt-
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out information with discussion of the negative consequences for user experience is likely to 
deter people from using this option to limit behavioural tracking.  
Within the privacy policies we examined, disclosure of documented third-party tracking 
practices was limited, and the language used in the disclosures that did appear tended to be 
difficult to interpret. Thus, reading a privacy policy might not provide users with a full 
understanding of the behavioural tracking practices of the websites they visit, and as a result we 
need to consider additional mechanisms to identify and respond to behavioural tracking. 
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Chapter 3: Detecting, Mitigating, and Neutralizing Behavioural 
Tracking 
The results of this research indicate that behavioural tracking on consumer health 
information websites is widespread, with the large majority of such sites including some form of 
third-party tracking, and approximately half of the sites participating in tracking by third-party 
advertisers, a practice that raises the most significant privacy concerns. Our analysis of website 
privacy policies with respect to disclosure of these tracking practices reveals that even those 
policies that acknowledge tracking do so in ways that make it difficult to determine the tracking 
practices that are in place. From the perspective of consumers, these issues are exacerbated by the 
fact that sites recommended by librarians and other information science professionals are also 
likely to engage in behavioural tracking. Government sites, and to a lesser extent not-for-profit 
sites, show a lower level of behavioural tracking compared to commercial sites. This difference, 
however, is restricted to third-party advertising trackers, and does not apply to trackers in general. 
Increasingly, regulatory frameworks are being developed, or extended, to cover the 
collection and use of NPII, and internet users who are concerned about the collection and use of 
their personal information through behavioural tracking measures can launch complaints to 
relevant bodies, including the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Information 
Commissioner’s Office in the United Kingdom. However, in the absence of direct investigation, 
triggered by such a complaint or launched by the organization responsible for regulatory 
enforcement, consumers cannot be assured that websites comply with applicable regulations. The 
situation is complicated by the fact that regulatory interpretation can be challenging. In Canada, 
for example, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada recently reported findings on the use of 
sensitive health information for targeting of Google ads9, determining that this use contravened 
both PIPEDA and the organization’s privacy policy. The complaint was determined to be well-
founded, and in response Google undertook remedial measures that included period searches for 
the use of terms such as ‘CPAP’ or ‘sleep apnea’ within Google advertising products. This 
response, while effective for the particular complaint in question, does not provide general 
                                                
9 [1] https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2014/2014_001_0114_e.asp 
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protection with respect to Google use of other information that users might consider sensitive: the 
use of behavioural tracking information on searches for ‘epilepsy’ or ‘weight loss’, for example, 
is not being monitored by Google. Regulation of the collection and use of NPII is important, and 
the actions of regulatory bodies in this respect are valuable and effective. At the same time, 
however, users cannot rely on these regulatory responses for privacy protection, and instead must 
become active participants in the preservation of their privacy online. 
In considering responses to limit or even eliminate behavioural tracking, it must first be 
acknowledged that these practices provide some benefit to website users and thus it may not be 
their desire or even in their best interests to eliminate behavioural tracking. Behavioural tracking 
mechanisms enhance the experience of users in many ways and make the browsing experience 
more efficient. They are used to personalize websites, display information relevant to the 
geographic area where a user is located, remember registration details and content users have put 
in a shopping basket. Targeted advertising can also be positive for many people. Ultimately, it 
should be a user’s choice to decide when he or she wants to be tracked. Different levels of actions 
are possible for users to control, on their own, when they are being tracked. Each of them, 
however, comes with a downside. 
The easiest step is for users to learn how to manage HTTP cookies in every web browser 
that they use. Users can decide to refuse third-party cookies or even all cookies. The latter, 
however, will make the make the browsing experience much less efficient and may impede users 
from accessing some websites. Users should also learn how to delete cookies and think about 
emptying the cookie file of each of their browsers periodically. A more advanced and more 
complex step, yet crucial considering the capabilities of Flash cookies, is to learn how to manage 
Flash Cookies through the Adobe Website Storage Settings Panel. Browser extensions, such as 
Ghostery and AdBlock Plus10, can be added to most browsers. Ghostery allows users to block 
trackers, either on a tracker-by-tracker basis, a site-by-site basis or a mixture of the two. Also 
customable, Adblock Plus allows users to block either all advertisements or only the ones they do 
not want to see. These extensions, however, may slow down Internet browsing. 
                                                
10 https://adblockplus.org/ 
 37 
Users can also change their Internet use habits. It is possible for user to use search engines 
that do dot store any NPII, such as Ixquick11 and DuckDuckGo12. Ixquick returns the top ten 
results from multiple search engines. It only sets one cookie that remembers a user’s search 
preferences and that is deleted after a user does not visit Ixquick for 90 days. DuckDuckGo, 
which returns the same search results for a given search term to all users, aims at getting 
information from the best sources rather than the most sources. While these search engines do not 
have all the functionality of the major search engines, both of them have received praise (e.g. 
McCracken, 2011). The ultimate solution, one that allows a user to navigate online total 
anonymity, is to use the Tor13 web browser, which impedes network surveillance or traffic 
analysis and which the U.S. National Security Agency has characterized as “the King of high 
secure, low latency Internet anonymity” (Schneier, 2013). The anonymity afforded by Tor, 
however, comes at the price of reduced speed and limitations to available content. 
                                                
11 https://www.ixquick.com/ 
12 https://duckduckgo.com/ 
13 www.torproject.org/torbrowser/ 
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Chapter 4: Dissemination and Knowledge Mobilization 
4.1 Dissemination to the Academic Community 
Dissemination and knowledge mobilization activities for this project were carried out in 
three domains: academic, professional, and general public. With respect to the first group, the 
results of this research were presented to academic audiences at a number of academic 
conferences (I3: Information, Interactions and Impact, June 25-28, 2013, Aberdeen, Scotland; 
Association for Information Science and Technology: Beyond the Cloud: Rethinking Information 
Boundaries, November 1-5, 2014, Montréal, Québec), and future presentations are planned at 
several other conferences (Association French language pour le savoir, May 12-16, 2014, 
Montréal, Québec; Graphics, Animation, and New Media, Annual Conference, May 14-16, 2014, 
Ottawa, Ontario). The results of this research are in preparation for publication in academic 
journals. The first of these papers will examine the presence of tracking on consumer health 
websites, contrasting the results for sites recommended by library and information professionals 
with the results for sites returned by Google searches. The second of these papers will examine 
privacy policy disclosures of tracking mechanisms on consumer health websites. In future 
publications, we will examine tracking mechanisms and privacy policy disclosures on French 
language websites. 
4.2 Dissemination to the Professional Community 
An important aspect of dissemination involved communication of the research to 
professionals in the library and information science community. Our goals in this professional 
outreach are twofold: first, to improve the understanding of LIS professional regarding 
behavioural tracking and associated privacy issues in order that they can make privacy-respecting 
decisions and recommendations for themselves and their patrons; second, to provide background 
to LIS professionals to support their digital literacy outreach initiatives. We have presented at the 
Ontario Library Association Superconference (January 29 – February 1, Toronto, Ontario, and a 
presentation on this research has been accepted at the Canadian Health Libraries Association 
conference (June 16-20, 2014, Montréal, Québec). We are planning a webinar on behavioural 
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tracking mechanisms and strategies to manage tracking for the Ontario Library Association; this 
presentation will take place in the summer of 2014. Further opportunities to provide direct 
education to information science professionals are available to each of the investigators in their 
teaching activities. Dr. Burkell is a faculty member at the University of Western Ontario in the 
Faculty of Information and Media Studies, where she regularly teaches a course on Consumer 
Health Information, and she will integrate training on privacy and behavioural tracking in this 
and other relevant courses. Mr. Fortier is completing his PhD in Library and Information Science. 
He regularly teaches in the LIS program at UWO, and he will be seeking a faculty appointment 
once he has completed his PhD. He too will have the opportunity to incorporate education 
regarding privacy and behavioural tracking into his course syllabi. We are promoting the results 
of the research and the educational initiatives including the video (see below) produced as part of 
the project through a ‘Focus on Research’ profile on the Canadian Library Association website. 
Finally, we are preparing a paper on behavioural tracking mechanisms and strategies to manage 
these mechanisms for Library Quarterly, which is a journal directed to information professionals. 
4.3 Dissemination to the Public 
Finally, we have had opportunity for direct outreach to the general public. In partnership 
with the London Public Library, we provided public lectures on behavioural tracking (January 27, 
2014) and social network privacy (February 24, 2014). In addition, we have provided links to our 
educational video and related publications for incorporation into library materials on online 
privacy. 
4.3.1 Educational Video 
Another important aspect of dissemination involved the production and promotion of an 
educational video on behavioural tracking mechanisms and responses. Copies of this educational 
video were provided (on USB keys) to attendees at the Ontario Library Association conference, 
and links to this educational material will be provided to the Canadian Library Association and 
the Ontario Library Association for inclusion in their educational materials regarding privacy and 
online behavioural tracking. This video was promoted at the public lecture offered at the London 
Public Library, and links to the online versions (French and English) of the video were provided 
to the London Public Library for use on their website and in their privacy-related educational 
materials.  
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The educational video was designed and produced for dissemination in presentations and 
online through websites (such as public library websites). The video uses animation and 
testimonials to create awareness of online tracking mechanisms with the following objectives: 
• To describe different kinds of mechanisms exist and how they work. 
• To present advantages and disadvantages these mechanisms may have for individuals in the 
online environment. 
• To offer potential tools and protocols (through browsers or software) for managing these 
mechanisms. 
• To present the implications of behavioural tracking from a privacy standpoint both on 
general and consumer health websites. 
Expert interviews were conducted with Valerie Steeves (University of Ottawa, 
Department of Criminology), Avner Levin (Ryerson University, Ted Rogers School of 
Management, Director of the Privacy Institute), Andrew Clement (University of Toronto, Faculty 
of Information, Identity Privacy and Security Institute), and Jacquelyn Burkell (Western 
University, Faculty of Information and Media Studies). These experts described the implications 
of behavioural tracking and the broader picture of the state of privacy on the internet, including a 
need for public awareness and ultimately public debate. In addition, we interviewed a number of 
internet users regarding their understanding of and attitudes toward behavioural tracking. These 
interviews were coupled with animated sequences explaining behavioural tracking mechanisms 
and strategies for reducing behavioural tracking. Appendix V includes a copy of the final video 
scripts in both English and French. 
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Conclusion 
Our investigation focused on consumer health information websites because, as we argue 
in the introduction to this report, online searches for health information reveal highly sensitive 
information. The privacy risks associated with tracking of health information seeking are, 
therefore, exacerbated, and particular care must be taken to ensure that privacy is protected in the 
health domain. 
The results of this research demonstrate that third-party behavioural tracking is present on 
the large majority (4 out of 5) of consumer health websites, and over half of consumer health 
websites have trackers from third-party advertisers. This level of tracking is observed on French 
and English language websites, and on those recommended by Library and Information Science 
associations as well as those returned by a regular Google search. Government sites are 
essentially free from tracking by third-party advertisers, and overall commercial sites show much 
higher level of tracking (by advertisers and by third parties in general including analytics 
companies) than do government sites or sites from not-for-profit agencies. Even government 
sites, however, have high levels of tracking by non-advertising third parties including analytics 
companies, and although the privacy implications of this type of third-party tracking are reduced 
relative to advertising uses, privacy considerations remain (Mayer and Mitchell, 2012). Our 
analysis of privacy policy disclosure of tracking practices indicates that disclosure is inconsistent, 
incomplete, and difficult to understand. Thus, behavioural tracking is widespread on consumer 
health information sites, and privacy policies are not effectively informing consumers of website 
tracking practices. 
This research provides a snapshot of behavioural tracking practices and disclosures on 
consumer health information websites at a particular point in time (Spring 2013 for the English 
language sites and Fall 2013 for the French language sites). We recognize that behavioural 
tracking is a moving and indeed expanding target, and we have every reason to believe that 
tracking practices on these sites will have changed since we completed our data collection: new 
tracking companies will have emerged, new uses for behavioural tracking data will have been 
identified, and new technologies will have been developed. The importance of our results is less 
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the specific number and identity of trackers, and more the demonstration that behavioural 
tracking is widespread on consumer health websites, that many of these websites allow third 
party advertisers to collect behavioural data on their sites, and that the disclosure of these data 
collection practices is insufficient to fully inform users. 
Online privacy management is a digital literacy issue (Park, 2013), and users of consumer 
health information websites need to be supported in identifying privacy-respecting resources and 
making informed choices regarding their privacy. We consider Library and Information Science 
professionals to play a critical role both in directing consumers to privacy-respecting resources 
and in providing digital literacy education that will assist users of consumer health information 
websites (and other websites as well) to make informed choices regarding their online privacy. In 
order to address theses issues, Library and Information Science professionals must first become 
familiar with these tracking mechanisms, the risks they present, and the strategies (such as setting 
browsers to refuse cookies) that consumers can use to combat them. Second, they must monitor 
the behaviour tracking practices of the websites they recommend to consumers, identifying those 
websites that use behavioural tracking mechanisms and therefore present to users the privacy 
risks associated with profiling. Finally, Library and Information Science professionals should 
engage in digital literacy initiatives that promote an understanding, among the general public, of 
online behavioural tracking, including the related privacy risks and responses to mitigate these 
risks (Lankshear and Noble, 2008). The research results reported here and the activities 
undertaken to disseminate these results will assist in achieving these goals. 
While regulatory frameworks serve to limit behavioural tracking and mandate disclosure 
of tracking practices, it is also important that users take measures to understand the privacy risks 
they encounter, and make informed decisions about their own online privacy. Ultimately, the 
Internet is a place where users must protect themselves, and we must provide them with the tools 
and information they need to do so.  
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Appendix I: Recommended Websites
http://www.intelihealth.com/ 
http://my.clevelandclinic.org/ 
http://familydoctor.org/ 
http://hardinmd.lib.uiowa.edu/ 
http://www.healthfinder.gov/ 
http://www.healthlinkplus.org/ 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/ 
http://www.medhelp.org/ 
http://www.medicinenet.com/ 
http://www.medlineplus.gov 
http://www.netwellness.org/ 
http://www.noah-health.org 
http://www.feminist.com/ 
http://www.hormone.org/ 
http://www.ihr.com/ 
http://www.mypelvichealth.org/ 
http://www.healthywomen.org 
http://www.menopause.org 
http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org 
http://www.womenshealth.gov/ 
http://www.ahrq.gov/ 
http://www.cdc.gov/ 
http://www.urologyhealth.org/ 
http://www.aap.org 
http://www.aacap.org/ 
http://www.drgreene.com 
http://www.whattoexpect.com 
http://www.kidshealth.org 
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health 
http://www.virtualpediatrichospital.org 
http://aarp.org/health/ 
http://www.aoa.gov/ 
http://www.agingcare.com/ 
http://www.healthinaging.org/ 
http://www.medicare.gov/ 
http://www.caregiver.org 
http://www.firstgov.gov/Topics/Seniors.sht
ml/ 
http://www.gmhfonline.org/gmhf/ 
http://nihseniorhealth.gov/ 
http://www.alz.org/ 
http://www.aad.org/public 
http://www.ada.org/ 
http://www.diabetes.org/ 
http://www.americanheart.org/ 
http://www.lungusa.org/ 
http://www.aafa.org/ 
http://www.cancer.gov/ 
http://digestive.niddk.nih.gov/index.htm/ 
http://www.nei.nih.gov/health/ 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/ 
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/ 
http://www.nia.nih.gov/ 
http://www.niams.nih.gov/ 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/index
.shtml/ 
http://www.ninds.nih.gov 
http://www.stroke.org/ 
http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/ 
 II 
http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/DrugsNew/Def
ault.aspx?MenuItem=Drugs&Search=On 
http://www.centerwatch.com/patient/drugs/d
rugdirectories.html 
http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugI
nfo.cfm?id=2115 
http://www.fda.gov 
http://www.longwoodherbal.org 
http://www.mskcc.org/cancer-
care/integrative-medicine/about-herbs-
botanicals-other-products 
http://druginfo.nlm.nih.gov/drugportal/drugp
ortal.jsp 
http://www.needymeds.org 
http://www.pdrhealth.com/home/home.aspx 
http://www.rxlist.com/script/main/hp.asp 
http://www.ama-assn.org/aps/amahg.htm 
http://www.centerwatch.com/ 
http://ClinicalTrials.gov/ 
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/ 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/ 
http://hpd.nlm.nih.gov/ 
http://www.quackwatch.com/ 
http://www.aboutkidshealth.ca/ 
http://www.caringforkids.cps.ca/ 
http://www.cancer.ca/ 
http://canadasafetycouncil.org/ 
http://www.dietitians.ca/ 
http://www.heartandstroke.com/ 
http://www.heretohelp.bc.ca/ 
http://sexualityandu.ca/ 
http://passeportsante.net/ 
http://www.womenshealthmatters.ca/
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Appendix II: Websites Returned by Google (English)
http://allergicliving.com/ 
http://allergies.about.com/ 
http://allergyuk.org/ 
http://bodyandhealth.canada.com/ 
http://canadiansleepsociety.com/ 
http://chealth.canoe.ca/ 
http://curegoutpainnow.com/ 
http://diabetes.about.com/ 
http://diabetesshop.ca/ 
http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
http://findprivateclinics.ca/ 
http://forums.parentscanada.com/ 
http://health.nytimes.com/ 
http://heartdisease.about.com/ 
http://helpguide.org/ 
http://inspection.gc.ca/ 
http://lung.ca/ 
http://lupuscanada.org/ 
http://lupusuk.org.uk/ 
http://pollen.com/ 
http://ruk.ca/ 
http://skin-disorders.net/ 
http://sleepclinic.org/ 
http://sleepdisorders.about.com/ 
http://sleepmed.to/ 
http://sleepnet.com/ 
http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/ 
http://thelupussite.com/ 
http://www.aftershingles.com/ 
http://www.agingincanada.ca/ 
http://www.allergyfoundation.ca/ 
http://www.arthritis.about.com 
http://www.arthritis.ca/ 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
http://www.bhf.org.uk/ 
http://www.canada.com/ 
http://www.canadiansleepsociety.com/ 
http://www.cbc.ca/ 
http://www.ctv.ca 
http://www.dailyglow.com/ 
http://www.diabetes.com/ 
http://www.doctorq.ca/ 
http://www.everydayhealth.com/ 
http://www.fascrs.org/ 
http://www.gallbladderattack.com 
http://www.gallbladderdetox.com/ 
http://www.gallbladdersymptomsz.com/ 
http://www.gout-aware.com/ 
http://www.gout.com/ 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ 
http://www.healthcommunities.com/ 
http://www.heart.org/ 
http://www.heartandstroke.com/ 
http://www.hemorrhoids.org/ 
http://www.hemorrhoidtreatment.info/ 
http://www.imhr.ca/ 
http://www.lupus.org/ 
http://www.lupusontario.org/ 
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/ 
http://www.medicinenet.com 
http://www.natcm.ca/ 
http://www.naturalskinrepair.com/ 
http://www.netdoctor.co.uk/ 
http://www.nhs.uk/ 
http://www.patient.co.uk/ 
http://www.pilex.com/ 
http://www.publichealthgreybruce.on.ca/ 
http://www.rheumatology.org/ 
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http://www.rolingstone.com/ 
http://www.sages.org/ 
http://www.skincarecentre.ca/ 
http://www.skinsight.com/ 
http://www.sleepdisorders.com/ 
http://www.sleepdisorderssleepapnea.com/ 
http://www.sleepfoundation.org/ 
http://www.umm.edu/ 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
http://www.webmd.com/ 
http://www.womenshealth.gov/ 
http://www.youtube.com/ 
http://yorkregionsleep.com/ 
http:/www.hemorrhoid.com/
 
 
 V 
Appendix III: Websites Returned by Google (French) 
http://afriquinfos.com‎/ 
http://agora.qc.ca/ 
http://arthritisbroadcastnetwork.org/ 
http://asthme-allergies.org/ 
http://asthmeallergies.com/ 
http://ca.loccitane.com/ 
http://combattrelagoutte.ca/ 
http://cusm.ca/ 
http://dejouerlesallergies.com/ 
http://diabete.fr/‎ 
http://drdupied.com/ 
http://fr.healthierchoices.ca/ 
http://fr.wiktionary.org/ 
http://grmo.ca/ 
http://immunize.ca/ 
http://infotheque.muhc.ca/ 
http://jointhealth.org/ 
http://lecoeurtelquelles.ca/ 
http://lesexploitsducoeur.ca/ 
http://lyon-sud.univ-lyon1.fr/ 
http://muhcpatienteducation.ca/ 
http://naitreetgrandir.com/ 
http://pilule.telequebec.tv/ 
http://pourquoi-docteur.nouvelobs.com/ 
http://qualita.ca/ 
http://quebec.huffingtonpost.ca/ 
http://rire.ctreq.qc.ca/ 
http://sante-az.aufeminin.com/ 
http://sante-guerir.notrefamille.com/ 
http://sante-
medecine.commentcamarche.net/ 
http://sante.canoe.ca/ 
http://sante.journaldesfemmes.com/ 
http://sante.lefigaro.fr/ 
http://santecapitalenationale.gouv.qc.ca/ 
http://santecheznous.ca/ 
http://santenature.over-blog.com/ 
http://selection.readersdigest.ca/ 
http://styledevie.ca.msn.com/ 
http://survivornet.ca/ 
http://tf1.fr/ 
http://tvanouvelles.ca/ 
http://www.aaia.ca/ 
http://www.accu-chek.fr/‎ 
http://www.afd.asso.fr/ 
http://www.alfediam.org/ 
http://www.allodocteurs.fr/ 
http://www.alzheimerestrie.com/ 
http://www.antiphlogistine.com/ 
http://www.anusol.ca/ 
http://www.aqaa.qc.ca/ 
http://www.arthrite.ca/ 
http://www.atoute.org/ 
http://www.avogel.ca/ 
http://www.babycenter.ca/ 
http://www.bayerdiabetes.ca/ 
http://www.bd.com/ 
http://www.brainpop.fr/ 
http://www.canalvie.com/ 
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http://www.cancer.ca/ 
http://www.carenity.com/ 
http://www.carevox.fr/ 
http://www.ceed-diabete.org/‎ 
http://www.cfpc.ca/ 
http://www.chirurgie-digestive-bizet.com/ 
http://www.chu-sainte-justine.org/ 
http://www.chumontreal.qc.ca/ 
http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/ 
http://www.clarisonic.ca/ 
http://www.cliniquealthea.com/ 
http://www.cliniquedrdanielbarolet.com/ 
http://www.cliniquevaccinationrivesud.com/ 
http://www.collabopm.com/ 
http://www.comprendrechoisir.com/ 
http://www.coupdepouce.com/ 
http://www.cpa.ca/ 
http://www.crc.chus.qc.ca/ 
http://www.crisedegoutte.com/ 
http://www.crisegoutte.com/ 
http://www.crulrg.ulaval.ca/ 
http://www.cssslaval.qc.ca/ 
http://www.curel.ca/ 
http://www.dermatonet.com/ 
http://www.dermatoveto.com/‎ 
http://www.diabete.qc.ca/ 
http://www.diabetelaval.qc.ca/ 
http://www.diabetes.ca/ 
http://www.docteurclic.com/ 
http://www.doctissimo.fr/ 
http://www.dolfino.tv/ 
http://www.douglas.qc.ca/ 
http://www.douleurchronique.org/ 
http://www.dumaisnd.qc.ca/ 
http://www.e-diabete.org/‎ 
http://www.e-sante.fr/ 
http://www.eatrightontario.ca/ 
http://www.educationnutrition.org/ 
http://www.elle.fr/ 
http://www.ellequebec.com/ 
http://www.enfant-encyclopedie.com/ 
http://www.entraidediabetique.org/ 
http://www.entrepatients.net/ 
http://www.esantementale.ca/ 
http://www.estelledaves.com 
http://www.eurekasante.fr/ 
http://www.extenso.org/ 
http://www.familiprix.com/ 
http://www.femmeactuelle.fr/ 
http://www.femmesensante.ca/ 
http://www.fissureanale.com/ 
http://www.fmcoeur.qc.ca/ 
http://www.fmoq.org/ 
http://www.futura-sciences.com/ 
http://www.germannewmedicine.ca/ 
http://www.gralon.net/ 
http://www.groupeproxim.ca/ 
http://www.gsk.ca/ 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ 
http://www.healthycanadians.gc.ca/ 
http://www.hemoroidetraitement.com/ 
http://www.herbes-medicinales.ca/ 
http://www.inflammgen.org/ 
http://www.info-sante.info/ 
http://www.infobebes.com/ 
http://www.inserm.fr/ 
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http://www.inspection.gc.ca/ 
http://www.inspq.qc.ca/ 
http://www.jeancoutu.com/ 
http://www.jetaide.com/ 
http://www.kidney.ca/ 
http://www.lapresse.ca/ 
http://www.laroche-posay.fr/ 
http://www.lemonde.fr/ 
http://www.linternaute.com/ 
http://www.liver.ca/ 
http://www.lupus-reference.info/ 
http://www.lupuscanada.org/ 
http://www.lupusreunion.com/ 
http://www.madmoizelle.com/ 
http://www.marlene-morin.ca/ 
http://www.maxisciences.com/ 
http://www.medecine-et-sante.com/ 
http://www.medscape.fr/ 
http://www.medtronic.fr/ 
http://www.medtronicdiabete.ca/ 
http://www.merial.ca/ 
http://www.moietcie.ca/ 
http://www.momes.net/ 
http://www.montreal-diabetes-research-
center.org/ 
http://www.msss.gouv.qc.ca/ 
http://www.msss.gouv.qc.ca/ 
http://www.nospetitsmangeurs.org/ 
http://www.notretemps.com/ 
http://www.novartis.ca/ 
http://www.oiiq.org/ 
http://www.oncologik.fr/ 
http://www.ordrepsy.qc.ca/ 
http://www.orpha.net/ 
http://www.osrmedical.com/ 
http://www.ottawaheart.ca/ 
http://www.parlonsdiabete.com/‎ 
http://www.passeportsante.net 
http://www.peau.net/ 
http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/ 
http://www.plaisirssante.ca/ 
http://www.pourlascience.fr/ 
http://www.pq.poumon.ca/ 
http://www.procto.ca/ 
http://www.protegez-vous.ca/ 
http://www.psychologies.com/ 
http://www.rhumatismes.net/ 
http://www.santedesfemmes.com/ 
http://www.santeprivee.ca/ 
http://www.santevoyagehorizon.com/ 
http://www.saveurs-sante.com/ 
http://www.savoirlaitier.ca/ 
http://www.sdhu.com/ 
http://www.securite-allergie.ca/ 
http://www.sfdiabete.org/‎ 
http://www.shepellfgi.com/ 
http://www.skinceuticals.fr/ 
http://www.skinpatientalliance.ca/ 
http://www.snfge.asso.fr/ 
http://www.sommeil-mg.net/ 
http://www.sos-hemorroides.fr/ 
http://www.specialisteschirurgie.ca/ 
http://www.topsante.com/ 
http://www.uniprix.com/ 
http://www.virtuogym.com/ 
http://www.vivre-mieux-naturellement.com/ 
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http://www.vulgaris-medical.com/ 
http://www.who.int/ 
http://www.zostavax.ca/ 
http://www1.pharmaprix.ca/ 
http://yoopa.ca/ 
https://fr.wikipedia.org/ 
https://sommeil.univ-lyon1.fr/
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Appendix IV: Trackers
[X+1] 
24/7 Media*14 
5min Media 
Accuen Media 
Acuity Ads 
Acuityads.com 
Acxiom 
Ad Decisive 
ad6media 
AdAction 
ADAOS 
Adap.TV 
Adblade 
adBrite 
Adconion 
AddThis 
AdForm 
AdGear 
Adify 
Adition 
AdJug 
Adknowledge 
Adloox 
AdMeld* 
Adnologies 
Adobe Adlens 
Adobe Digital Marketing 
                                            
14 The trackers followed by an 
asterisk are those identified as 
advertisers.  
Adometry 
AdoTube 
Adroit Digital Solutions 
AdRoll 
AdScale 
AdTech* 
Advert Stream 
Advertising.com 
AdXpose 
Adyoulike 
Aggregate Knowledge 
Akamai 
Alenty 
AlmondNet 
Amazon Associates* 
AMP Platform 
AOL Advertising* 
AOL OBA Notice 
AppNexus* 
areyouahuman 
AT Internet 
Atedre 
Atlas 
atmda.com 
Audience Science 
Aweber 
Banner Connect 
Bazaarvoice 
BBElements 
bidswitch.net 
Bizo 
Blink New Media 
BlueCava 
BlueKai 
Bluelithium 
BlueStreak 
Boldchat 
BrandScreen 
Bright Tag 
BrightCove 
BrightRoll 
Brilig 
Burst Media 
Buysight 
BuzzFeed 
C-Col.com 
CanWest Global 
Casale Media 
Cedexis Radar 
Centro 
Chango 
Chartbeat 
ClearSaleinG 
Clearsaleing 
Clickbank 
Clickbooth 
ClickTale 
Clicky 
 X 
ClixGalore 
Collective 
Commission Junction 
CompeteXL 
Connexity 
ContextIn 
ConvertMedia 
Convio 
Conviva 
CoreAudience 
CPX Interactive 
Crazy Egg 
Criteo 
Crowd Science 
Dataium 
Datalogix 
DataXu 
delvenetworks.com 
Demandware Analytics 
DemDex 
DG Mediamind* 
Didit Maestro 
Didit Maestro 
Digilant 
Disqus 
Dotomi 
Dotsub 
DoubleClick Bid 
Manager* 
DoubleClick DART 
DoubleClick Floodlight 
Doubleclick Spotlight 
DoubleClick* 
DoubleVerify 
Drawbridge 
Dynamic Logic 
EchoSearch 
Effective Measure 
Ensighten 
EQ Advertising 
eStat 
EverydayHealth 
Evidon Notice 
eXelate Media 
Experian Marketing 
Services 
Exponential* 
eXTReMe Tracker 
eyeReturn Marketing 
Eyeview 
Ezakus 
Facebook 
Facebook Beacon 
Facebook Connect 
Facebook Conversion 
Facebook Exchange (FBX) 
Facebook Social Graph 
Facebook Social Plugins 
Flashtalking.com 
FluidSurveys 
FlyerTown 
ForeSee 
FreeWheel 
FruitFlan 
GDN Notice 
Gigya 
Gigya Socialize 
Google +1 
Google Adsense* 
Google AdWords* 
Google AJAX Search API 
Google Analytics 
Google Custom Search 
Engine 
Google JSAPI Stats 
Collection 
Google Tag Manager 
Gravity.com 
gsk.com 
hearst.co.uk 
Hello Bar 
HIRO 
Histats 
Hit-Parade 
i-Behavior 
Impact-ad 
Improve Digital 
Impulse 
InfoLinks 
Infolinks 
Integral Ad Science 
InviteMedia 
iPerceptions 
Jumptap 
Kaltura 
Kenshoo 
Kintera 
KissInsights 
Komli 
 XI 
Korrelate 
Krux Digital 
LeadBack 
Legolas Media 
Ligatus 
Lijit 
Lijit Networks 
LinkedIn 
Linksmart 
LivePerson 
LiveRail 
LiveRamp 
Lockerz Share 
LongTail Video Analytics 
Lotame 
Lucid Media 
Magnetic 
MaxPoint Interactive 
McAffee Secure 
Medbroadcast 
Media Innovation 
Media Optimizer 
Media6Degrees 
MediaMath* 
MediaMind 
Mediaplex 
Metrigo 
Microsoft Atlas* 
Mindset Media 
MixPanel 
MLN Advertising 
Moat 
Monetate 
MyFonts Counter 
Netmining 
NetRatings 
NetSeer 
Neustar AdAdvisor 
New Relic 
news registry 
NextAction 
nRelate 
Nugg.Ad 
OMD (Omincom) 
Omniture 
Ooyala 
Opentracker 
OpenX* 
Optimax Media Delivery 
Optimizely 
orlive.com 
Outbrain 
OwnerIQ 
OwnerIQ 
Parse.ly 
Perfect Audience 
Pingdom 
Pinterest 
Piwik Analytics 
Piximedia 
Platform161 
PointRoll 
Polldaddy 
Prisma Media Digital 
Proven Pixel 
Public Ideas 
PubMatic* 
PulsePoint 
Qualtrics 
Quantcast* 
Qubit 
Questionmarket 
RadiumOne 
RapLeaf 
Redux Media 
Resonate Networks 
Right Media* 
Rivity 
rnengage 
Rocket Fuel 
ROI trax 
Rubicon* 
Sas 
saymedia 
ScoreCard Research 
Beacon 
scribblelive 
Segmint 
ShareThis 
SimpleReach 
Simpli.fi 
SiteMeter 
SiteScout 
skimlinks* 
skyword 
SMART AdServer* 
SocialReach 
Soundcloud 
SpecificClick 
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SpecificMEDIA 
Spongecell 
SpotXchange 
Statcounter 
SundaySky 
surfing-waves.com 
Surveymonkey.com 
Switch Adserver 
Taboola 
Tacoda 
Tapad 
Targus Info 
Tedemis 
Telemetry 
theGuardian 
TidalTV 
tinyurl 
Topsy 
TradeDesk 
tradedoubler 
Tradelab 
Tremor Video 
Tribal Fusion 
Triggit 
Trove 
Truste Notice 
Tube Mogul 
TubeMogul 
Tumblr Buttons 
Turn* 
Twitter Advertising 
Twitter Badge 
Twitter Button 
Twitter.com 
Tynt 
Tynt Insigh 
Typekit by Adobe 
Typekit by Adobe 
Undertone Networks 
Unica 
Userreport 
UserVoice.com 
ValueClick Mediaplex* 
Veruta 
Videoplaza 
VigLink 
Vimeo 
Vindico 
Visual Revenue 
Visual Website Optimiser 
Vizu 
VoiceFive 
WaterfrontMedia 
WebMD 
Weborama 
WebTrends 
WidgetBox 
Wishabi 
WordPress Stats 
Wunderloop Connect 
WysiStat 
Yahoo Analytics 
Yahoo! Ad Network 
Yieldlab 
Youtube.com 
YuMe 
Zanox 
Zazzle 
Zedo 
Zenovia Digital Exchange
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Appendix V: Scripts for the Dissemination Video 
 
Speaker English script French script 
S1 [LIVE]: VIDEO TEASER (VAL, AVNER, ANDREW) (about 17 seconds) 
Val Because that kind of surveillance is 
invisible online, we kind of go to sleep. 
Parce que ce genre de surveillance est 
invisible en ligne, c’est comme si nous 
étions endormis. 
Avner Unfortunately right now we don’t have 
effective protection. 
Malheureusement, nous n’avons pas en ce 
moment de protection efficace. 
Andrew We now have installed a major spying 
operation which has gone by completely 
without public debate. 
Nous avons désormais installé une 
opération d’espionnage majeure sans que 
le moindre débat public ait eu lieu. 
They know where you've been, they know 
what you've done 
On sait ce que vous regardez, on sait ce 
que vous aimez 
Text 
Online behavioural tracking Le pistage comportemental en ligne 
S2 V/O [ANIMATION] 
Narrator When you look up medical information 
on the Internet, you probably know that 
some of it might be inaccurate or 
misleading. But there’s another problem 
that’s less obvious. It’s called behavioural 
tracking, and its effects can be just as 
serious. 
Vous savez peut-être que l’information 
relative à la santé sur internet peut être 
incomplète, biaisée, voire simplement 
erronée. Or, savez-vous qu’il faut aussi 
vous méfier d’un problème presque 
invisible dont les effets peuvent être tout 
aussi néfastes : le pistage 
comportemental. 
Text Online behavioural tracking Le pistage comportemental en ligne 
S3 V/O [ANIMATION] 
Narrator Mechanisms for behavioural tracking 
include browser cookies as well as newer 
technologies such as flash cookies and 
web beacons. 
Le pistage comportemental utilise 
l’agrégation de données non personnelles 
obtenues par des mécanismes tels les 
témoins et les pixels-espions. 
Behavioural tracking mechanisms Les mécanismes de pistage 
comportemental 
Browser cookies Témoins de navigateur 
Flash cookies Témoins Flash 
Text 
Web beacons Pixels-espions 
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Browser cookies are small text files that 
are stored on your computer when you 
visit a website. They contain information 
such as your IP address, the pages you 
visit, the time of your visit, and your 
actions on the site. 
Les témoins, aussi appelés « cookies », 
sont de petits fichiers sauvegardés sur 
votre ordinateur lorsque vous visitez un 
site web. Ils contiennent des 
renseignements tels que votre adresse IP, 
les pages web que vous visitez, le temps 
de votre visite et vos actions sur le site 
web. 
Narrator 
There are two types of cookies: First 
Party Cookies and Third Party Cookies. 
Les témoins peuvent provenir du site web 
que vous visitez ou d’une tierce partie. 
Browser cookies Témoins de navigateur 
IP address Adresse IP 
Pages visited Pages visitées 
Time spent Temps passé 
Mouse clicks Actions de l’utilisateur 
First-party cookies Témoins provenant du site web visité 
Text 
Third-party cookies Témoins provenant de tierces parties 
Narrator First Party Cookies are written and read 
by a website each time you visit. The 
information stored is typically used to 
personalize your experience on the site: 
for example, to show you new 
information related to a previous search. 
A history of your visits to the website can 
be assembled by using the information 
stored on these types of cookies. First 
Party Cookies written by one site cannot 
be accessed by other websites and do not 
generally present a privacy threat. 
À chacune de vos visites sur un site web, 
des témoins provenant du site web lui-
même peuvent enregistrer de 
l’information sur vos actions et cette 
information est normalement utilisée pour 
personnaliser votre expérience. Le site 
web peut se servir, par exemple, d’une 
recherche antérieure pour vous montrer 
des produits susceptibles de vous 
intéresser. Les témoins provenant 
directement du site web que vous visitez 
ne sont pas accessibles à d’autres sites et 
ne présentent d’ordinaire pas de menace à 
la protection de votre vie privée. 
First-Party Cookies (set directly by the 
website) 
Témoins provenant du site web visité 
“Remember this” (Or use "Save this") Sauvegarder ceci 
“You liked this” Vous avez aimé ceci 
Text 
“Try this” Essayez cela 
Narrator Sometimes, however, there are advertisers 
present on a site. They can write what are 
called Third-Party cookies. These same 
advertisers will be present on many other 
Il peut arriver, par contre, qu’un site web 
contienne des témoins provenant de 
tierces parties, tel un annonceur 
publicitaire. Le même annonceur est 
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sites that you visit and they have access to 
information about all of these visits 
through cookies that they write. 
souvent présent sur plusieurs sites et 
possède donc un accès privilégié à vos 
comportements sur le web grâce à 
l’agrégation de données colligées d’un 
site web à l’autre. 
Third-Party cookies present a bigger 
privacy problem because as you surf the 
web, advertisers build a detailed profile 
on what you like, what you do, even what 
worries you by linking together the 
information from the many cookies that 
they write to your computer. Even though 
you aren’t directly identified by this, a lot 
of information is being saved. 
Les témoins provenant de tierces parties 
présentent une menace plus importante 
pour la protection de votre vie privée, car 
les profils qu’ils peuvent permettre 
d’assembler sont très précis. 
 
Sale Solde Text 
Third-Party Cookies (set by ads on the 
website) 
Témoins provenant de tierces parties 
Advertisers use more than just cookies 
such as newer technologies such as Flash 
and web beacons. 
De nouvelles technologies, tels les 
témoins Flash et les pixels-espions sont 
aussi utilisés. 
Flash cookies are similar to HTTP 
cookies in many ways, but they are 
managed by Adobe Flash Player and they 
can ‘respawn’ or rewrite deleted browser 
cookies, creating ‘zombie cookies’ that 
can’t easily be (deleted). 
Les témoins Flash sont semblables aux 
témoins traditionnels, à la différence 
qu’ils sont gérés par le Flash Player 
d’Adobe. Les témoins Flash ont 
également la capacité de ressusciter les 
témoins que vous auriez effacés. 
Narrator 
Web Beacons are invisibly embedded in 
many web pages and emails. And they 
can also gather information from regular 
cookies at the same time. 
Les pixels-espions sont des pixels 
invisibles insérés dans le code d’une page 
web. Ils sont capables de collecter le 
même type d’information que les témoins 
et sont également capables d’interagir 
avec eux. 
Flash cookies Témoins Flash 
Web beacons Pixels-espions 
Sale Solde 
1 pixel x 1 pixel 1 pixel x 1 pixel 
IP address Adresse IP 
Times & length of visit Moment et durée de la visite 
Text 
User interaction Actions de l’utilisateur 
S4 V/O [ANIMATION] 
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Narrator In some cases behavioural tracking can be 
beneficial. Websites can use tracking 
mechanisms to personalize your 
experience, delivering the information 
you want the way you want it. Tracking 
also allows advertisers to provide ads of 
interest. 
Il arrive que le pistage comportemental ait 
des effets positifs. Les sites web utilisent 
ces mécanismes pour personnaliser votre 
expérience. Ils permettent également aux 
annonceurs de vous montrer des 
publicités qui sont près de vos intérêts. 
First-Party Cookies (set directly by the 
website) 
Témoins provenant du site web visité 
“Remember this” (Or use "Save this") Sauvegarder ceci 
“You liked this” Vous avez aimé ceci 
“Try this” Essayez cela 
Text 
These might be of interest to you… Vous pourriez être intéressé par ceci 
S5 [LIVE]: STREETER CLIPS 
Streeter 
1 
The store, knowing what I want and being 
able to recommend and personalize it for 
me... I would see it more as a benefit than 
a detriment. 
Qu’un magasin connaisse ce que je veux 
et soit capable de me faire des 
recommandations personnalisées… je 
vois cela plus comme un avantage que 
comme un inconvénient. 
Streeter 
2 
Sometimes they can help you directly 
search when shopping... 
Parfois, on vous aide à trouver ce que 
vous voulez. 
Streeter 
3 
I just do it for the sake of quicker 
browsing... 
Je le fais parce que c’est simplement plus 
efficace. 
I like the benefit of having things 
recommended to you, saving you time.  
J’aime profiter des suggestions qu’on me 
fait, cela fait gagner du temps. 
If they’re utilized well, then there’s a lot 
of benefit, right? 
Si elles sont bien utilisées, il y a plusieurs 
avantages, non? 
Streeter 
4 
‘Cause from my perspective, I’m going to 
see ads anyways, I might as well see ads 
that are appealing to me. 
Je vais voir des publicités de toute façon, 
aussi bien voir des publicités susceptibles 
de m’intéresser. 
S6 V/O [ANIMATION] 
Narrator But what’s gathered through tracking 
could be used to discriminate against 
people. Credit card companies, for 
example, could deny credit to individuals 
who have searched for credit counselling; 
insurers could raise rates for people who 
have searched for diabetes treatment. 
These are only a couple of examples that 
show how behavioural tracking could put 
Il arrive par contre que l’information 
collectée serve à discriminer un 
utilisateur. Une compagnie de crédit, par 
exemple, pourrait traiter différemment 
quelqu’un ayant cherché de l’information 
sur le recouvrement de dettes. Un 
assureur pourrait offrir un prix différent à 
quelqu’un ayant cherché de l’information 
sur telle ou telle maladie. Ces deux 
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you at a disadvantage: making services or 
products more expensive, or even 
resulting in denial of service. 
exemples ne servent qu’à illustrer à quel 
point le pistage comportemental pourrait 
jouer contre vous sans que vous le 
sachiez. 
Online profile Profil de l’utilisateur 
Credit denied Demande de crédit refusée 
How much? Combien? 
An additional 10% for your condition Un supplément de 10 % en raison de votre 
maladie 
Text 
Behavioural tracking Pistage comportemental 
S7-1 [LIVE]: VAL (24 SECS) 
This type of information really does 
constrain us because it’s taken out of 
context. 
Ce genre d’information nous contraint 
vraiment, car elle est prise hors contexte. 
When I’m talking to my friends online, 
I’m not talking to my mother. When I’m 
talking to my mother, I’m not talking to 
my employer. 
Quand je m’adresse à des amis en ligne, 
je ne m’adresse pas à ma mère. Quand je 
m’adresse à ma mère, je ne m’adresse pas 
à mon employeur. 
Val 
And my behaviour online depends on who 
I’m interacting with. Once I lose the 
ability to keep all of those various lines 
between my roles in place, it becomes 
really uncomfortable for all of us. 
Et mes comportements en ligne vont 
dépendre de la personne à qui je 
m’adresse. Si nous perdons la capacité de 
garder ces séparations en place, cela 
devient très inconfortable pour nous tous. 
Valerie Steeves Valerie Steeves 
University of Ottawa Université d’Ottawa 
Text 
Department of Criminology Département de criminologie 
S7-2 [LIVE]: JACQUIE 
Jacquie The kind of targeting that we’re talking 
about, the shaping of the world around 
you on the basis of information that 
you’ve essentially leaked in your 
practices online, has implications for the 
choices that you can make, it has 
implications for the options that are 
presented to you. 
Le genre de ciblage dont nous parlons — 
la définition de notre environnement en 
fonction des informations que nous avons 
disséminé avec nos comportements en 
ligne — a des conséquences sur les choix 
que nous faisons. Il y a des conséquences 
sur les options qui nous sont présentées. 
Jacquelyn Burkell Jacquelyn Burkell 
University of Western Ontario University of Western Ontario 
Text 
Faculty of Information & Media Studies Faculty of Information and Media Studies 
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S8 V/O [ANIMATION] 
Text And there’s not much you can do about it 
under current laws.  
Et les lois actuelles ne nous protègent 
guère. 
S9 [LIVE]: AVNER (22 SECS) 
Unfortunately right now we don’t have 
effective protection. That’s the sad state 
of where we are with all of our regulators, 
and we have a system of privacy 
commissioners. 
Malheureusement, en ce moment, nous 
n’avons pas de protection efficace. C’est 
un triste état où nous sommes avec nos 
législateurs, même si nous avons un 
système de commissariats à la protection 
de la vie privée. 
Avner 
That’s not an effective way for somebody 
to get action in their favour if they’re 
facing a problem. If they were, let’s say, 
denied coverage by their insurance 
company, the privacy commissioner is not 
the answer to their woes. 
Ce n’est pas un moyen efficace pour 
quelqu’un lorsqu’il est confronté à un 
problème. Si quelqu’un, par exemple, se 
voyait refuser d’être assuré, le 
commissariat à la protection de la vie 
privée n’y pourrait rien. 
Avner Levin Avner Levin 
Ryerson University Ryerson University 
Ted Rogers School of Management Ted Rogers School of Management 
Text 
Director of the Privacy Institute Directeur du Privacy Institute 
S10 V/O [ANIMATION] 
Narrator So what does it take for people to realize 
there need to be limits? The revelation of 
the US National Security Agency’s 
wholesale monitoring of internet traffic 
served as a wake-up call to some. 
Que devons-nous attendre pour réaliser 
que certaines limites ne doivent pas être 
franchies? Les révélations d’Edward 
Snowden sur les activités de la National 
Security Agency ont réveillé certains 
d’entre nous. 
NSA Revelations Révélation sur les activités de la National 
Security Agency 
Text 
Online surveillance Surveillance en ligne 
S11 [LIVE]: VAL (22 SECS) 
People might be uncomfortable if they 
think, oh, someone might be watching 
me, but because that kind of surveillance 
is invisible online, we kind of go to sleep.  
Les gens peuvent être inconfortables à 
l’idée qu’on les surveille, mais parce que 
ce genre de surveillance est invisible en 
ligne, c’est comme si nous étions 
endormis. 
Val 
We kind of ignore it, because it isn’t in 
our face. Typically what mobilizes public 
debate around these issues are these 
C’est comme si nous l’ignorions, parce 
qu’elle n’est pas flagrante. Typiquement, 
ce qui mobilise le débat public, ce sont les 
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 incidents, or episodes, like the NSA 
revelations, where people kind of go 
‘Hey, wait a minute, that’s not alright. 
événements comme les révélations sur les 
activités de la National Security Agency. 
Les gens se réveillent alors et se rendent 
compte que ce n’est pas normal. 
S12 [LIVE]: ANDREW (40 SECS) 
Great expansion of the state surveillance, 
often in collaboration or collusion with 
the large corporate internet providers is a 
challenge to our democratic system of 
government. 
Une grande expansion de la surveillance, 
souvent en collaboration ou en collusion 
avec les grands joueurs internet, est un 
défi pour nos systèmes démocratiques. 
We now have installed a major spying 
operation which has gone by completely 
without public debate.  
Nous avons désormais installé une 
opération d’espionnage majeure sans que 
le moindre débat public ait eu lieu. 
Andrew 
If you think that’s ok, then I’m afraid that 
you have problems with democracy, 
because democracy would insist that it’s 
the individual rights that take paramount, 
and that the state needs to be accountable 
to the citizens, not the other way around. 
Si vous croyez que c’est correct, j’ai peur 
que vous ayez un problème avec la 
démocratie, car ce sont les droits 
individuels qui priment en démocratie. 
C’est l’État qui doit rendre des comptes 
aux citoyens et non le contraire. 
Andrew Clement Andrew Clement 
University of Toronto University of Toronto 
Faculty of Information Faculty of Information 
Text 
Identity Privacy and Security Institute Identity Privacy and Security Institute 
S13 [LIVE]: JACQUIE 
When you’re health information online, 
you can be seeking information about 
really sensitive issues. And often it’s not 
even about you - you can be seeking 
information about somebody else. 
Quand nous cherchons de l’information 
relative à la santé en ligne, nous pouvons 
chercher de l’information hautement 
privée. Et, souvent, ce n’est même pas à 
propos de nous. 
But the profile that you’re developing 
says an awful lot potentially about who 
you are, about what you’re concerned 
about, about what you’re doing, about 
what your health is like.  
Mais le profil que nous développons ce 
faisant peut en dire long sur nous, sur ce 
qui nous concerne, sur ce que nous 
faisons, sur notre état de santé. 
Jacquie 
And that information can be used for the 
kind of social sorting that many people 
have talked about that has financial and 
professional and other kinds of 
implications. 
Et cette information peut être utilisée pour 
stratifier les gens, une pratique qui peut 
avoir des implications financières, 
professionnelles ou autre. 
S14 V/O [ANIMATION] 
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Narrator Advertisers are always coming up with 
new ways to collect data about you and if 
you want to protect your privacy, you 
need to keep up to date on mechanisms 
and be aware of how to manage them. 
What can we do to limit what advertisers 
know about us? 
Vos comportements sur internet sont une 
mine d’or pour les annonceurs et ceux-ci 
ne renonceront pas à l’exploiter. Si vous 
désirez protéger votre vie privée, vous 
devez vous tenir au courant des différents 
mécanismes de pistage comportemental et 
de la manière avec laquelle vous pouvez 
les gérer. 
Text Sale Solde 
tS15-1 [LIVE]: STREETER 5 (YOUNG MAN) (22 SECS) 
There are various tools and plug-ins on 
your browser that you can use to wipe 
away your digital trail, to mask your 
online usage, so that various companies 
don’t know all these things about you.  
Il y a plusieurs outils et modules 
d’extension qu’on peut ajouter à nos 
navigateurs qui peuvent effacer notre 
empreinte en ligne de manière à ce qu’on 
ne puisse pas en savoir autant sur nous. 
Streeter 
5 
There are often negative consequences – 
you might not get cool services, but that is 
a decision an individual should be able to 
make. 
Il y a souvent des conséquences 
négatives, comme la perte de 
fonctionnalité. Mais il s’agit d’une 
décision qu’un individu devrait pouvoir 
prendre. 
S15-2 [LIVE]: JACQUIE 
Jacquie It’s a matter of being aware, of thinking 
about this as a possibility, of knowing the 
world in which you’re operating and 
taking the steps you need to take in order 
to minimize your risk. 
Il s’agit d’être au courant, de penser à 
cette possibilité, de connaître le monde 
dans lequel on opère et de prendre les 
mesures nécessaires pour minimiser les 
risques. 
S16 V/O [ANIMATION] 
Narrator Here’s a few things that you can do to 
protect yourself from behavioural tracking 
– always remembering there’s a trade-off 
between convenience and security. 
Voici quelques gestes que vous pouvez 
faire pour vous protéger contre les 
conséquences du pistage comportemental. 
Prenez note, par contre, qu’il y a un 
équilibre à atteindre entre la facilité 
d’utilisation d’un site web et la protection 
de votre vie privée. 
Convenience Facilité d’utilisation Text 
Security Protection de la vie privée 
Narrator READ: Protect yourself by knowing what 
might be collected about you and how it 
might be used by reading privacy policies 
and terms of service.  
You should know, however, that 
Sachez quelles informations peuvent être 
collectées et comment elles peuvent être 
utilisées en lisant les politiques de 
protection de la vie privée des sites web 
que vous visitez.  
 XXI 
disclosure of behavioural tracking is not 
required by regulation, so if there is no 
disclosure you can’t be absolutely sure 
that there is no tracking. 
Prenez note, par contre, que la 
réglementation actuelle n’oblige pas les 
sites web à divulguer le pistage 
comportemental. 
READ: Privacy policies & Terms of Use Lisez les politiques de confidentialité 
Disclosure not required Divulgation non obligatoire 
Privacy policy Politique de confidentialité 
Text 
“Nothing here about tracking” Rien ici sur le pistage 
Narrator DELETE/SET: Periodically delete 
cookies in all the browsers that you use 
OR set your browsers to refuse them. 
Effacez régulièrement les témoins dans 
chacun de vos navigateurs ou réglez vos 
préférences pour refuser les témoins ou 
les témoins provenant de tierces parties. 
DELETE: cookies periodically in all of 
your browsers. 
Effacez régulièrement les témoins dans 
chacun de vos navigateurs 
Text 
SET: browsers to refuse cookies Réglez vos préférences pour refuser les 
témoins ou les témoins provenant de 
tierces parties 
Narrator BLOCK: Install applications such as 
Ghostery that identify web beacons and 
allows you to block them.  
Installez une application comme Ghostery 
qui identifie les pixels-espions et vous 
permet de les bloquer. 
Text BLOCK: Install software that will block 
web beacons. 
Installez une application qui vous permet 
de bloquer les pixels-espions 
Narrator MANAGE: flash cookies by changing 
Adobe Flash Player settings. 
Gérez les témoins Flash en apprenant à 
ajuster les paramètres du Flash Player 
d’Adobe. 
Text MANAGE: flash cookies by changing 
Adobe Flash Player settings. 
Gérez les témoins Flash en apprenant à 
ajuster les paramètres du Flash Player 
d’Adobe 
There are many resources online that will 
help you keep on top of behavioural 
tracking. 
Plusieurs ressources sont disponibles sur 
internet pour vous aider à gérer les 
mécanismes de pistage comportemental.  
Narrator 
Most of all, being aware that these 
mechanisms exist, understanding what 
information is collected and how it might 
be used is the first step to protecting your 
privacy online. 
Être au courant de ces mécanismes, 
comprendre quelle information est 
collectée et comment elle peut être 
utilisée est, en somme, la première étape 
pour protéger votre vie privée sur internet. 
 
